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VIRTUOUS LAW-BREAKING 
G. ALEX SINHA* 
ABSTRACT 
A rapidly growing body of scholarship embraces virtue jurisprudence, 
a series of (often ad hoc) attempts to incorporate the philosophical tradition 
of virtue ethics into legal theory. Broadly understood, virtue ethics 
describes an approach to moral questions that emphasizes the importance 
of developing and embodying various virtues, often as manifestations of 
human flourishing. Scholars typically contrast virtue ethics with 
deontological and consequentialist moral theories, tracing virtue-centered 
analysis to ancient Greek philosophers, and in particular 
to Aristotle. Virtue ethics has experienced a revival over the past 65 years; 
but, long before that, it proved especially influential in Catholic moral 
thought, particularly through the work of Aquinas. Perhaps relatedly, 
scholars have seized on virtue jurisprudence to defend a range of politically 
conservative positions, such as originalist constitutional interpretation and 
the propriety of utilizing the law to regulate ostensibly “private” 
immoralities.   
This Article reveals the radically underappreciated progressive 
promise of virtue jurisprudence. Virtue jurisprudence requires no religious 
commitments whatsoever, but a strong version entails acceptance of the 
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the law. On a compelling understanding of the virtues, rejecting a state of 
perpetual disadvantage under the law is a meaningful marker of the virtue 
of self-respect, and a repudiation of the vice of servility that would 
otherwise be imposed by the legal system itself. Thus, contrary to the 
predominant tenor of research on the subject, virtue jurisprudence can 
ground significant resistance to—and even defiance of—the law. In making 
this argument, the Article also draws novel connections between virtue 
jurisprudence and literature on (inter alia) race, feminism, and sexual 
orientation to reveal the unnoticed potential of virtue jurisprudence to push 
forward work in those and related areas. At a time when massive and 
widespread protests across the United States reflect a groundswell of 
support for overturning certain long-standing, legally-ingrained, systemic 
disadvantages of people of color, many might be surprised to learn that 
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 In the spring of 2020, in the midst of an ongoing global COVID–19 
pandemic that had already killed approximately 100,000 Americans, 
protestors surged into the streets in response to the Minneapolis police 
killing an unarmed Black man named George Floyd.1 That incident, which 




1. See generally Cumulative Cases, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. & MED.: CORONAVIRUS RES. 
CTR., https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/cumulative-cases [https://perma.cc/HY6U-BZQ8] (last updated 
Jul. 16, 2020, 3:00 AM) (charting COVID–19 cases and deaths around the world and showing 
approximately 100,000 confirmed U.S. deaths by May 26); see also A Timeline of the George Floyd and 
Anti-Police Brutality Protests, AL JAZEERA (June 11, 2020), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/06/timeline-george-floyd-protests–200610194807385.html 
[https://perma.cc/GDR4-VV3N ] (providing a timeline and backstory for the protests, which began on 
May 26, the day after George Floyd was killed). A bystander recorded the end of Floyd’s encounter with 
a group of four police officers. The video depicts Floyd, hands cuffed behind his back, pinned to the 
ground on his stomach while a white, male officer kneels on Floyd’s neck. See also Christine Hauser et 
al., ‘I Can’t Breathe’: 4 Minneapolis Officers Fired After Black Man Dies in Custody, N.Y. TIMES (May 
26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/26/us/minneapolis-police-man-died.html 
[https://perma.cc/R49M-GHP7] (last updated June 15, 2020) (describing the video and showing part of 
it). The video shows the officer, Derek Chauvin, ignoring Floyd’s pleas for air. Id. Chauvin continued 
to apply pressure to Floyd’s neck for at least eight minutes and 15 seconds. See Nicholas Bogel-
Burroughs, 8 Minutes, 46 Seconds Became a Symbol in George Floyd’s Death. The Exact Time Is Less 
Clear, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/18/us/george-floyd-
timing.html#click=https://t.co/krx9rgdPbb [https://perma.cc/2H7D–8QK8] (last updated June 20, 
2020). That span included almost three minutes after Floyd became unresponsive. See Trone Dowd, 
George Floyd Was Held Down for Almost 3 Minutes After He Went Unresponsive and Had No Pulse, 
VICE (May 29, 2020, 6:53 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/4ayvew/george-floyd-was-held-
down-for-almost–3-minutes-after-he-went-unresponsive-and-had-no-pulse [https://perma.cc/S3K9-
E3XA]. Floyd was eventually taken to a hospital, where he was pronounced dead. See George Floyd: 
What Happened in the Final Moments of His Life, BBC NEWS (July 16, 2020), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada–52861726 [https://perma.cc/R76E–7P6M]. An autopsy 
commissioned by Floyd’s family later concluded that Floyd “died not just because of the knee on his 
neck—held there by the officer, Derek Chauvin—but also because of two other officers who helped pin 
him down by applying pressure on his back.” Frances Robles & Audra D.S. Burch, How Did George 
Floyd Die? Here’s What We Know, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/article/george-floyd-autopsy-michael-baden.html [https://perma.cc/CB89-
F8AE]. The county medical examiner concurred that Floyd was killed by the police while they were 
restraining him. See Lorenzo Reyes, Trevor Hughes & Mark Emmert, Medical Examiner and Family-
Commissioned Autopsy Agree: George Floyd’s Death Was a Homicide, USA TODAY (June 1, 2020, 
11:33 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/06/01/george-floyd-independent-
autopsy-findings-released-monday/5307185002/ [https://perma.cc/8WSA–3G4X] (last updated June 1, 
2020, 8:46 PM). Nearly a year later, a jury convicted Chauvin of charges arising from the incident, 
finding him guilty of second-degree murder, third-degree murder, and second-degree manslaughter. 
Janelle Griffith & Corky Siemaszko, Derek Chauvin guilty of murder in George Floyd’s death, NBC 
NEWS (Apr. 20, 2021), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/derek-chauvin-verdict-reached-trial-
over-george-floyd-s-death-n1264565 [https://perma.cc/M23J-N0PR].  
2. See Christine Hauser et al., ‘I Can’t Breathe’: 4 Minneapolis Officers Fired After Black 
Man Dies in Custody, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/26/us/minneapolis-police-man-died.html [https://perma.cc/R49M-











protests that quickly spread across the country and even far abroad.3 The 
demonstrations have largely advanced the messaging of Black Lives Matter, 
denouncing racism and police violence against Black people.4 Protests have 
been massive and widespread.5 Many have been entirely peaceful and 
lawful;6 others have remained peaceful but manifested modest civil 
disobedience, such as the violation of local curfews;7 and still others have 




3. See Protests Across the Globe After George Floyd’s Death, CNN (June 13, 2020, 3:22 
PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/06/world/gallery/intl-george-floyd-protests/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/R49M-GHP7] (collecting photographs of Black Lives Matter protests from around the 
world). 
4. See Larry Buchanan et al., Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest Movement in U.S. 
History, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-
protests-crowd-size.html [https://perma.cc/GXV2–9L26] (referring to the demonstrations as “Black 
Lives Matter protests”). 
5. See Lara Putnam et al., Black Lives Matter Beyond America’s Big Cities, WASH. POST 
(July 8, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/07/08/black-lives-matter-
beyond-americas-big-cities/ [https://perma.cc/X8HR–3XMK] (estimating between 5,000 and 8,000 
discrete “anti-racism/anti-police-brutality” protests around the United States between the end of May 
and the first week of July of 2020, including many in small towns around the United States, and referring 
to the protests as “the largest sustained mobilization in the United States in our lifetimes.”). See also 
Larry Buchanan et al., supra note 4 (mapping some of the protests around the United States, graphically 
depicting their respective sizes, and estimating that between 15 and 26 million people had participated 
in protests as of early July). 
6. See Dalton Bennett et al., The Crackdown Before Trump’s Photo Op, WASH. POST (June 
8, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2020/06/08/timeline-trump-church-photo-
op/?arc404=true [https://perma.cc/GSF4-ZVSR] (noting that “[m]any [Black Lives Matter protests] 
were peaceful” and reporting in particular on the “largely peaceful demonstrators” who were removed 
by force from Lafayette Square, near the White House, on June 1, 2020). See also, e.g., Rusty Simmons, 
Hundreds March Peacefully in Martinez in Major Black Lives Matter Demonstration Following Mural 
Defacement, S.F. CHRON. (July 12, 2020, 9:31 PM), 
https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Protesters-gather-in-Martinez-for-major-Black–
15403218.php https://perma.cc/H55B–3AE3] (reporting on one peaceful protest in San Francisco). 
7. See Meg Kelly & Elyse Samuels, Who Caused Violence at Protests? It Wasn’t Antifa, 
WASH. POST (June 22, 2020, 3:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/06/22/who-
caused-violence-protests-its-not-antifa/ [https://perma.cc/59AK-KEPN] (“Officials have arrested more 
than 14,000 people across 49 cities nationwide since May 27, according to a Washington Post tally of 
data provided by police departments and included in media reports. Thousands were arrested for low-
level offenses, including curfew violations and failure to disperse.”); see also Brittney Martin, Texas 
Black Lives Matter Protesters Were Largely Local and Nonviolent, According to Arrest Data, TEXAS 
MONTHLY (June 25, 2020), https://www.texasmonthly.com/news/texas-protest-arrest-data-nonviolent-
local/ [https://perma.cc/D9AU-M3BY] (noting that protests in Texas were “largely local and 
nonviolent,” and reporting that “[t]he majority of apprehensions during the first week of demonstrations 
over police violence were for curfew violations, obstructing roadways, and other low-level offenses.”). 
See also Sally J. Scholz, Civil Disobedience in the Social Theory of Thomas Aquinas, 60 THE THOMIST: 
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW 449, 451 (1996) (quoting James Rachels in defining “civil 
disobedience” as “public, conscientious, nonviolent refusal to comply with the law.”). 
8. See Dalton Bennett, et al., The Crackdown Before Trump’s Photo Op, WASH. POST (June 
8, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2020/06/08/timeline-trump-church-photo-
op/?arc404=true [https://perma.cc/GSF4-ZVSR] (noting that some Black Lives Matter protests 











The demands of the protestors speak to the empirically demonstrable, 
systemic disadvantages of people of color within the justice system.9 Many 
other groups—such as women, various religious minorities, and members 
of the LGBTQ community—also face pervasive disadvantages before the 
law.10 The tension inherent in transgressing the boundaries of the law 
intending to reform it raises fascinating questions that have generated 
substantial scholarly attention in the past. A generation of literature written 
in the years shortly after the American Civil Rights Movement in the 1950s 
and 1960s framed those questions in terms of duty or obligation: most 
generally, under what conditions and to what extent are members of a polity 
subject to a generic duty or obligation to obey the law?11 The answers vary, 
but they frequently depend on the legitimacy of (or overall level of justice 
manifested by) the state in question.12 
However, a rapidly-growing and extremely promising strand of legal 
theory casts doubt on such deontic framing for any number of important 
questions. In the 1950’s, independently of the Civil Rights Movement, 




Precinct Set On Fire, Businesses Looted, KOIN 6 News (June 25, 2020, 4:50 PM) 
https://www.koin.com/news/protests/portland-protest-march-george-floyd-blm-black-lives-matter-
rose-city-justice-rally-vigil/ [https://perma.cc/2J67-QDWP] (last updated June 26, 2020, 7:55 AM) 
(detailing reports that “[p]rotesters in Portland . . . looted businesses and set one side of Portland Police 
Bureau’s North Precinct on fire early Friday morning, after a night of demonstrations turned 
destructive.”). Notably, according to the FBI, “the greatest threat of lethal violence [at the protests] 
continues to emanate from lone offenders with racially or ethnically motivated violent extremist 
ideologies and [domestic violent extremists] with personalized ideologies,” including members of 
certain right-wing extremist groups. Martin, supra note 7. 
9. See infra Section III.A. 
10. See infra Section III.A. 
11. See infra text accompanying notes 137–144. 
12. For example, according to William Edmundson: 
Theories of political obligation normally concede that there is no duty to obey the laws of unjust 
regimes. Positive accounts thus typically defend the view that there is a pro tanto duty to obey 
the laws of sufficiently just states, while allowing that other moral principles will be needed to 
support particular duties to comply with just laws promulgated or administered by unjust states. 
William A. Edmundson, The Virtue of Law Abidance, 6 PHILOSOPHERS’ IMPRINT 1, 6 (2006) [hereinafter 
Edmundson, Law Abidance].  
13. See COLIN FARRELLY & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, An Introduction to Aretaic Theories of the 
Law, in VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE 3–4 (Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2008) [hereinafter 
FARRELLY & SOLUM, Aretaic Theories] (tracing the etymology of the word “aretaic” to classical Greek 
and defining it as “of, or pertaining to, excellence or virtue”). See also generally Lawrence B. 
Solum, The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 475 (2005) (urging an aretaic 
turn in constitutional theory). Consensus treats the seminal moment for the aretaic turn in moral theory 
as the publication of G.E.M. Anscombe’s Modern Moral Philosophy in 1958. See LAW, VIRTUE & 
JUSTICE 1 (Amalia Amaya & Ho Hock Lai eds., 2013) [hereinafter Amaya & Lai, LAW, VIRTUE & 
JUSTICE] (“Virtue ethics re-emerged in the late 1950’s, with Elizabeth Anscombe’s important article 











in virtue ethics, an approach to moral philosophy inspired largely by 
Aristotle.14 Fundamentally, virtue ethics “emphasizes the virtues, or moral 
character, in contrast to an approach which emphasizes duties or rules 
(deontology) or which emphasizes the consequences of actions 
(utilitarianism [or consequentialism]).”15 The virtues themselves are 
dispositions, often carefully cultivated, to act well along particular 
dimensions when called upon by the circumstances—for example, to be 
courageous, humble, or charitable.16 Per traditional formulations, to embody 
the virtues is to function well as a human—that is, to flourish.17 Proponents 
believe virtue ethics offers a richer lens for evaluating moral deliberation 
than deontology and consequentialism;18 the virtues arguably shine a 
distinctive light on motives, moral character, “moral education, moral 
wisdom and discernment, friendship and family relationships, the role of 
emotions in our moral life, and the questions of what sort of person I should 
be, and of how we should live.”19 Virtue ethics now stands as a legitimate 
and prominent alternative to the consequentialist and deontological moral 




Theories of the Law in VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE 3–4 (Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2008) 
(similarly identifying Anscombe’s paper as the key influence in the aretaic turn in moral philosophy). 
14. Karen Stohr, Contemporary Virtue Ethics, 1 PHIL. COMPASS 22, 23 (2006) (“The dominant 
mode of virtue ethics has historically been, and continues to be, Aristotelian. By this I mean that most 
virtue ethicists see themselves as heavily indebted to Aristotle in some way, shape, or form.”). 
15. This is a serviceable but rather rough characterization. According to philosopher Rosalind 
Hursthouse,  
[T]he lines of demarcation between the three approaches have become blurred. Describing 
virtue ethics loosely as an approach which ‘emphasizes the virtues’ will no longer serve to 
distinguish it. By the same token, of course, deontology and utilitarianism are no longer 
perspicuously identified by describing them as emphasizing rules or consequences in contrast 
to characters. 
ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, ON VIRTUE ETHICS 1, 4 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999) [hereinafter, 
HURSTHOUSE, VIRTUE ETHICS]. This is, in part, because deontologists and consequentialists have begun 
incorporating certain elements of virtue ethics into their own theories. Id. at 3. I will introduce more 
precision in the following Section.  
16. See infra Section I.A.  
17. See infra Section I.A. Some readers may recognize a similarity between this notion of 
human flourishing and the capability approach made famous by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum 
(among others). For some background on the capability approach, see generally Ingrid Roybens & 
Morton F. Byskov, The Capability Approach, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Dec. 10, 2020) 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/capability-approach/ [https://perma.cc/47BS-LT2A]. Although virtue 
ethics and the capability approach are related, they are distinct enough that I will set aside the latter for 
the balance of this Article. 
18. Note also that I will treat the terms “utilitarianism” and “consequentialism” as 
interchangeable here, though the former is more properly understood as a specific form of the latter. 
19. HURSTHOUSE, VIRTUE ETHICS, supra note 15, at 3. 
20. HURSTHOUSE, VIRTUE ETHICS, supra note 15, at 2 (“And now in the latest collections (as 
I write, in 1998), [virtue ethics] has acquired full status, recognized as a rival to deontological and 











Running about a half-century behind, legal theory picked up on the 
aretaic turn as well, but in the form of “virtue jurisprudence”—the 
application of virtue analysis to various facets of the law.21  Virtue 
jurisprudence has proliferated rapidly; scholars have applied virtue-oriented 




other.”). See also Amaya & Lai, LAW, VIRTUE & JUSTICE LAW, supra note 13 at 1 (“Virtue ethics . . . 
has established itself as a major approach in normative ethics.”). 
21. See supra note 13 (describing this timeline by reference to numerous sources). In fact, 
exactly 50 years separate the publication of G.E.M. Anscombe’s paradigm-shifting paper in moral theory 
and the appearance of Colin Farrelly and Lawrence Solum’s foundational edited volume on virtue 
jurisprudence. Id.  
22. See Suzanna Sherry, Judges of Character, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793 (2003); 
Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, 34 METAPHILOSOPHY 
178 (2003) [hereinafter Solum, Judging]. See also Lawrence B. Solum, A Tournament of Virtue, 32 FL. 
ST. L. REV. 1365 (2005); Lawrence B. Solum, Judicial Selection: Ideology versus Character, 26 
CARDOZO L. REV. 659 (2005). 
23. See ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, Two Ways of Doing the Right Thing, in VIRTUE 
JURISPRUDENCE  236 (Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2008); Justice Jeff Brown, ‘‘A Scout 
Is Trustworthy”: Applying Virtue Ethics to Lawyer Professionalism, 3 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL 
MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 2 (2013); Michael S. McGinniss, Virtue Ethics, Earnestness, and the Deciding 
Lawyer: Human Flourishing in a Legal Community, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 19 (2011); Robert Araujo, 
S.J., The Virtuous Lawyer: Paradigm and Possibility, 50 S.M.U. L. REV. 433, 434 (1997); see also 
Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Professionalism in the Postmodern Age: Its Death, Attempts at Resuscitation, 
and Alternate Sources of Virtue, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 305, 305 (2000); Robert 
F. Cochran, Jr., Crime, Confession, and the Counselor-at-Law: Lessons from Dostoyevsky, 35 HOUS. L. 
REV. 327, 328 (1998); Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Lawyers and Virtues: A Review Essay of Mary Ann 
Glendon’s ‘A Nation Under Lawyers: How the Crisis in the Legal Profession is Transforming American 
Society’ and Anthony T. Kronman’s ‘The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession,’ 71 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 707, 708 (1996); Heidi Li Feldman, Beyond the Model Rules: The Place of 
Examples in Legal Ethics, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 409 (1999); Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and Virtues: 
Can Good Lawyers be Good Ethical Deliberators?, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 885, 908–09 (1996); James W. 
Perkins, Virtues and the Lawyer, 38 CATH. LAW. 185, 187 (1998); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal 
Profession's Rule Against Vouching for Clients: Advocacy and ‘The Manner That Is The Man Himself’, 
7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 145, 146 (1993); Abbe Smith & William Montross, 
The Calling of Criminal Defense, 50 MERCER L. REV. 443, 511–32 (1999); Paul R. Tremblay, The New 











antitrust law,24 bankruptcy law,25 criminal law,26 contract law,27 property 




24. See Elbert L. Robertson, A Corrective Justice Theory of Antitrust Regulation, 49 CATH. U. 
L. REV. 741 (2000). 
25. See Matthew Bruckner, The Virtue in Bankruptcy, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 233 (2013). 
26. See Claire O. Finkelstein, Duress: A Philosophical Account of the Defense in Law, 37 
ARIZ. L. REV. 251 (1995); Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1423 (1995); 
Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Criminal Negligence, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 431 (1998); Dan M. Kahan & 
Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1996); 
see also John Gardner, The Gist of Excuses, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 575 (1998); Victor Tadros, The 
Characters of Excuse, 21 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 495 (2001); Kyron Huigens, On Aristotelian 
Criminal Law: A Reply to Duff, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB POL’Y 465 (2004), (reprt. as Kyron 
Huigens, On Aristotelian Criminal Law: A Reply to Duff, in VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE 214 (Colin Farrelly 
& Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2008)); Kyron Huigens, Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, 90 GEO. L.J. 387 
(2002). See Eric L. Muller, The Virtue of Mercy in Criminal Sentencing, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 288, 
290 (1993); Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 31 (2003); 
Donald A. Dripps, Fundamental Retribution Error: Criminal Justice and the Social Psychology of 
Blame, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1430–31 (2003); Darryl K. Brown, Third-Party Interests in Criminal 
Law, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1383, 1383 (2002). But see Antony Duff, Virtue, Vice, and Criminal Liability, in 
VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE 193 (Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2008) (expressing skepticism 
about an Aristotelian approach to criminal law). 
27. See Chapin F. Cimino, Virtue and Contract Law, 88 OR. L. REV. 703 (2009). 
28. See DAVID LAMETTI, The (Virtue) Ethics of Private Property: A Framework and 
Implications, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW, OBLIGATIONS AND RESTITUTION 39 (A. 
Hudson ed., 2003); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821 (2009); see also 
Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 
745 (2009); Eric R. Claeys, Virtue and Rights in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 889 
(2009). But see Katrina M. Wyman, Should Property Scholars Embrace Virtue Ethics - A Skeptical 
Comment, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 991 (2009) (critiquing Peñalver’s theory of virtue ethics and property 
law). 
29. See David W. Opderbeck, A Virtue-Centered Approach to the Biotechnology Commons 
(Or, the Virtuous Penguin), 59 ME. L. REV. 315 (2007); see also Yochai Benkler & Helen Nissenbaum, 
Commons-based Peer Production and Virtue, 14 J. POL. PHIL. 394 (2006). 
30. See Lee J. Strang, Originalism's Promise, and Its Limits, 63 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 81, 99 
(2014); Lee J. Strang, Originalism and the Aristotelian Tradition: Virtue's Home in Originalism, 80 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1997 (2012). 
31. See Heidi Li Feldman, Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics and Tort 











law and governance,32 medical law,33 environmental law,34 international 
criminal justice,35 and more.36 Yet, for all of these substantive applications, 
virtue jurisprudence has barely contended with the most basic and 
fundamental subject that its adoption underscores: the relationship between 
human flourishing and the law itself.37  
Moreover, to the limited extent that scholars have explored the 
implications of tailoring the law to promote virtue-oriented human 
flourishing, their conclusions have been decidedly conservative. Some have 
relied on virtue jurisprudence to call for the law to regulate private but 




32. See Barbara Mescher & Bryan Howieson, Beyond Compliance: Promoting Ethical 
Conduct by Directors and Corporations, 1 CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REV. 93 (2005); James McConvill, 
Positive Corporate Governance and its Implications for Executive Compensation, 6 GERMAN L. J. 1777 
(2005); see also Ronald J. Colombo, Toward a Nexus of Virtue, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV 3 (2012); Mark 
Neal Aaronson, Be Just to One Another: Preliminary Thoughts on Civility, Moral Character, and 
Professionalism, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 113, 116 (1995). See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and 
Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 
CORNELL L. REV. 856, 858, 890 (1997); Caryn L. Beck-Dudley, No More Quandaries: A Look at Virtue 
Through the Eyes of Robert Solomon, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 117, 119–24 (1996); Jeffrey Nesteruk, The Moral 
Dynamics of Law in Business, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 133, 135–37 (1996); Jeffrey Nesteruk, Law, Virtue and 
the Corporation, 33 AM. BUS. L.J.  473, 473–75 (1996) [hereinafter, Nesteruk, Law, Virtue and the 
Corporation]. 
33. See Amaya & Lai, LAW, VIRTUE & JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 9, note 58 (Amalia Amaya 
& Ho Hock Lai eds., 2013) (citing two instances in which “virtue ethics has made its way into textbooks 
and monographs on medical law”). 
34. See Jeffrey M. Gaba, Environmental Ethics and Our Moral Relationship to Future 
Generations: Future Rights and Present Virtue, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 249, 251–52 (1999); Bradley 
A. Harsch, Consumerism and Environmental Policy: Moving Past Consumer Culture, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
543, 547–48 (1999). 
35. See Jamie Gaskarth, The Virtues in International Society, 18 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 431(2011). 
36. For some additional citations to works of virtue jurisprudence, see generally Solum, The 
Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory, supra note 13, at 493–95. I have borrowed a number of the 
citations offered above from Solum’s piece and from Amaya & Lai, LAW, VIRTUE & JUSTICE, supra 
note 13. Notably, I am not aware of a virtue-based analysis of policing, specifically, but there is no 
obvious basis for doubting that such an analysis would be possible. Given the complexities of the 
decisions faced by police in many instances, such an approach may in fact prove quite fruitful—subject 
to the limitations identified below for “role virtues.” See infra note 78. 
37. As I will outline below, the purist approach to virtue jurisprudence endorses the view that 
the focus of the law should be to promote the virtue-oriented flourishing of its subjects. See, e.g., 
FARRELLY & SOLUM, Aretaic Theories, supra note 13, at 2 (“For virtue jurisprudence, the final end of 
the law is not to maximize preference satisfaction or to protect some set of rights and privileges; the 
final end of law is to promote human flourishing—to enable humans to lead excellent lives.”). To take 
that view seriously requires us to engage with the ways in which the law also suppresses human 
flourishing. For reasons explored below, that essential exercise has proved rare in virtue jurisprudence. 
38. See generally, e.g., ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND 
PUBLIC MORALITY (Oxford Univ. Press, 1993) (defending “morals legislation” as a way of promoting 
the virtues of members of society); Timothy Cantu, Virtue Jurisprudence and the American 
Constitution, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1521 (2013) (arguing, inter alia, that modern constitutional 
jurisprudence on privacy rights and the decline of “traditional families” have undermined the virtues of 











supports originalist constitutional interpretation.39 And most (if not all) 
assume or defend some version of the view that compliance with the law is 
nearly always a marker of virtue.40 Perhaps this is unsurprising. For one, 
Aristotle viewed lawfulness as a virtue, subject to certain intricacies and 
conditions.41 Additionally, long before its recent resurgence in secular moral 
philosophy, virtue ethics found a home in Catholic moral thought, where it 
was embraced enthusiastically by Thomas Aquinas.42 Aquinas also viewed 
lawfulness as a virtue,43 and his intellectual successors often adopt a 
relatively conservative Christian perspective.44 
However, as this Article demonstrates, none of these associations are 
essential, and in fact they obscure the power of virtue jurisprudence. The 
relationship between human flourishing and the law is much more complex 
than most previous literature has acknowledged. And the virtues provide a 
valuable lens for exploring that relationship, especially once we abandon 
problematic assumptions that excessively exalt lawfulness. Probing the 
value of lawfulness also allows virtue jurisprudence to confront the 
important questions posed by police violence toward minorities. Even in 




39. See generally, e.g., Lee J. Strang, Originalism and the Aristotelian Tradition: Virtue's 
Home in Originalism, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1997, 2023 (2012) (relying on Aquinas to help ground a 
virtue-based argument in favor of originalist constitutional interpretation); see also Solum, supra note 
13, at 521–22 (carving out a prominent role for “original meaning” in his virtue-centered theory of 
“aretaic constitutional formalism”).  
40. See infra Section II. In centering virtue, however, we are no more bound by these views 
than we are to Aristotle’s notoriously regressive views of women or slaves. See HURSTHOUSE, VIRTUE 
ETHICS, supra note 15, at 2 (noting that “it must be emphasized that those who espouse virtue ethics 
nowadays do not regard themselves as committed to any of the lamentable, parochial details of 
Aristotle’s moral philosophy, any more than deontologists inspired by Kant think they are committed to 
his views on, for example, animals.”). 
41. See infra Section II.A 
42. See infra Section II.B. Note that one salient interpretation of Anscombe’s Modern Moral 
Philosophy, the paper credited with reviving virtue ethics, reads Anscombe as defending a form of 
Christian ethics. See Julia Driver, Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe, § 5.1, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA 
PHIL. (Jul. 21, 2009, rev. Feb. 8, 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/anscombe/ 
[https://perma.cc/TTS4-YNM9] (noting that “an alternative reading [of Modern Moral Philosophy] is 
as a modus tollens argument intended to establish the superiority of a religious based ethics” and 
explaining the basis for that interpretation). 
43. See infra Section II.B.  
44. For example, noted Christian scholar John Finnis has written extensively about Aquinas. 
See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY (Oxford Univ. Press 1999). 
45. The argument presented below does not turn on a judgment about whether the United 
States (or any other country) is reasonably just because adopting a virtue-centered analysis allows us to 
move past broad assessments of state legitimacy toward a nimbler approach. See Edmundson, Law 
Abidance, supra note 12, at 6 (observing that, relative to typical accounts of the generic duty to obey the 
law, “[a] virtue-ethical account need not place such stress on the moral credentials of the state; and this 











is virtuous under certain circumstances, the law itself also undermines the 
capacity of disadvantaged groups to manifest some traditional virtues.46 The 
law’s role in reinforcing ingrained inequality ensures that some of its 
demands impinge on the self-respect of members of those groups. As a 
result, theorists’ consistent demands that everyone respect the law will at 
times amount to demands for servility. Under conditions of longstanding 
inequities, a proper measure of self-respect may compel members of 
disadvantaged groups to resent or even defy the law. In other words, on a 
compelling understanding of the virtues, and under the facts as they exist in 
the United States today, the virtues will at times justify law-breaking, and 
that law-breaking will be morally good.47 
This Article thus explores the potential of virtue jurisprudence to 
support progressive change in the law, and in particular its promise for 
addressing longstanding, systemic inequities. In doing so, this Article 
highlights an advantage of the virtue-jurisprudential framing over the 
traditional deontic one: under the former, generic duties to obey the law give 
way to more tailored inquiries about the proper attitude one should take 
toward the law based on one’s specific position. More specifically, this 
Article articulates a basis for virtuous resistance of the law in self-respect, 
which manifests differently for members of different groups because of 
unequal treatment they experience at the hands of the law. This Article 
therefore offers an internal critique of virtue jurisprudence as it is typically 
applied, while also suggesting some advantages that virtue jurisprudence 
provides over alternative theoretical framings. 
Section I provides background on both virtue ethics and virtue 
jurisprudence. It distinguishes two variants of virtue jurisprudence and 
identifies a common problem in their application: scholars often use virtue 
jurisprudence to inform the analysis of ideal forms of the law, skipping past 
the logically prior question of how the law is applied in practice to shape 
the virtues and vices of it subjects. Section II lays out the virtue of 
lawfulness as it has been understood historically, identifying its role in 
codifying presumptions against law-breaking that have impeded a more 
progressive interpretation of virtue jurisprudence. Section III develops an 
argument for virtuous law-breaking grounded in the self-respect of 
members of systemically disadvantaged groups, which I refer to simply as 




46. See infra Section III.B. 
47. At minimum, conservative scholars of virtue jurisprudence must explicitly contend with 
the implications of their views for those who stand in a position of disadvantage before the law, 











to revise our traditional understanding of the virtue of lawfulness. Finally, 
Section IV draws out the substantial implications of the argument from self-
respect, both for virtue jurisprudence and beyond. 
I. THE ARETAIC TURN AND THE ARETAIC LEAP 
A. Virtue Ethics 
A brief description of virtue ethics will help ground the argument 
presented below. As noted in the Introduction, much contemporary writing 
on virtue ethics derives in some manner from the work of Aristotle, although 
there are many variations and additional possible influences.48 Because of 
its prominence, I focus on Aristotelian-inspired virtue ethics in this Article. 
In particular, I draw on a prominent neo-Aristotelian account developed by 
philosopher Rosalind Hursthouse, which is broadly representative of the 
virtue ethics movement on key points.49  
On Hursthouse’s view, most virtues are character traits50—relatively 
stable, reliable dispositions of people to act (externally) and react 
(internally) in a specific way to certain situations. For Hursthouse, an honest 
person will “avoid . . . dishonest deeds and do . . . honest ones in a certain 
manner—readily, eagerly, unhesitatingly, scrupulously, as appropriate”;51 
will respond with the appropriate emotions to dishonesty, such as feeling 
“distressed when those near and dear to them are dishonest”;52 and may be 
“particularly acute about occasions when honesty is at issue” (such as by 
“noticing, as we have failed to do, that someone is obviously not to be 
trusted . . . or that we are all allowing someone to be misled”).53 Virtues of 
this form become deeply embedded in us; they bear on “a person’s values, 




48. See Amaya & Lai, LAW, VIRTUE & JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 6 (noting that, “[w]hen 
lawyers rely on virtue ethics, they commonly draw on Aristotelian or neo-Aristotelian versions,” but 
also that “[o]ther important sources or traditions of virtue ethics [such as Plato, Confucianism, and 
Hume] have not received equal attention.”). See also HURSTHOUSE, VIRTUE ETHICS, supra note 15, at 8 
(“Michael Slote’s recent ‘agent-based’ version of virtue ethics is not at all, he thinks, Aristotelian, but is 
to be found in the nineteenth-century ethicist Martineau, and some of Christine Swanton’s work pays 
more attention to Nietzsche than to Aristotle.”). Hursthouse herself adopts a neo-Aristotelian base for 
her theory. See supra note 15. 
49. Hursthouse is explicit about the Aristotelian underpinnings of her account. See 
HURSTHOUSE, VIRTUE ETHICS, supra note 15, at 8. 
50. Limited exceptions include friendship and gratitude, which are not necessarily properly 
understood as traits. See id. at 11. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 11–12.  











perceptions, interests, expectations, and sensibilities.”54 They often must be 
cultivated with care, and at any rate take time and maturity to develop.55 
The list of virtues may vary and is subject to debate.56 Plato identified 
four cardinal virtues: wisdom, justice, fortitude, and temperance.57 Aristotle 
identified several intellectual virtues (such as practical wisdom and intuitive 
understanding),58 and roughly a dozen ethical virtues (such as courage and 
temperance).59 For Aristotle, ethical virtues share a structure; they constitute 
“a golden mean,” or “condition[s] intermediate . . . between two other states, 
one involving excess and the other deficiency.”60 For example, a courageous 
person is neither excessively fearful, and therefore cowardly, nor 
excessively indifferent to danger, and therefore rash.  Instead, he “judges 
that some dangers are worth facing and others are not, and experiences fear 
to a degree that is appropriate to his circumstances.”61 Other virtues may not 
fit this model, however. For example, Lawrence Solum has written at some 
length about the difficulty of conceptualizing the virtue of justice as a 
mean.62 
A person manifesting the virtues, whatever those may be, “is a morally 
good, excellent, or admirable person who acts and reacts well, rightly, as 




54. Id. (quoting Stephen Hudson, Human Character and Morality (1986)).  
55. See id. at 113–19 (using the example of racism to explore the complex process of 
inculcating values by training emotional responses).  
56. See id. at 8 (“Charity or benevolence, for example, is not an Aristotelian virtue, but all 
virtue ethicists assume it is on the list now.” (parentheses omitted)).   
57. Dorothea Frede, Plato’s Ethics: An Overview, § 3.2, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Sep. 16, 
2013, rev. Dec. 6, 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-ethics/ [https://perma.cc/3DMD-
Q8FK]. 
58. Richard Kraut, Aristotle’s Ethics, § 6, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (May 1, 2001, rev. June 
15, 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-ethics/#InteVirt [https://perma.cc/9R6K-PKS4]. 
59. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach, 13 MIDWEST 
STUDIES IN PHIL. 32, 36–37 (1987) (listing, in addition to the intellectual virtues, ethical virtues from 
“the most important spheres of experience recognized by Aristotle,” including courage, moderation, 
justice, generosity, expansive hospitality, greatness of soul, mildness of temper, truthfulness, easy grace, 
an unnamed form of friendliness, proper judgment, and practical wisdom). For more on the difference 
between intellectual and ethical virtues, see Kraut, supra note 58, at § 4. 
60. Kraut, supra note 58, at § 5. 
61. Id. at § 5.1. 
62. Solum, The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory, supra note 13, at 513–15 (arguing that 
“Aristotle found it difficult to fit justice into the schema of virtue as a mean between two opposing vices 
with respect to a morally neutral affective state such as an emotion or desire” and exploring the possible 
theoretical implications of that conclusion). But see Mark LeBar & Michael Slote, Justice as a Virtue, § 
1.1, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Mar. 8, 2002, rev. Jan. 21, 2016), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-virtue/ [https://perma.cc/3U6E-ARU7] (describing Aristotle’s 
view as distinguishing between the personal virtue of justice and a related but different concept of 
political justice for constitutions and political arrangements). 











one of them in its proper form is to possess them all.64 One common 
interpretation of the Aristotelian view is that virtue is essential for 
eudaimonia, typically translated as “flourishing” or “happiness.”65 
Eudaimonia refers to a distinctive, objective manner in which humans (as 
distinctively rational beings) may thrive. Hursthouse perceives “two 
interrelated claims” in the notion that the virtues are necessary for 
eudaimonia: first, “that the virtues benefit their possessor,” and second, 
“that the virtues make their possessor good qua human being (human beings 
need the virtues in order to live a characteristically good human life).”66 For 
Aristotle, achieving eudaimonia is the highest good, meaning it is desirable 
for itself, it is not desirable as a means to some other good, and it is the 
reason all other goods are desirable.67 
Notably, a revival in scholarly interest in moral views of this sort 
prompted some consequentialists and deontologists to take virtue more 
seriously as well.68 Suffice it to say that virtue has proved a useful concept 
for illuminating a range of salient moral questions,69 even for those who do 
not accept every aspect of virtue ethics, such as a virtue-centered theory of 




64. See John Finnis, Aquinas’ Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy, § 4.2.1, STAN. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Dec. 2, 2005, rev. Apr. 29, 2020),  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aquinas-
moral-political/#VirtAlsoSourRathThanConcMoraJudg [https://perma.cc/FTF4-VT4L] (“Aquinas 
firmly holds the Platonic-Aristotelian thes[i]s of the connexio virtutum: that to have any of the virtues in 
its full and proper form one must have all of them. . . .”). 
65. See HURSTHOUSE, VIRTUE ETHICS, supra note 15, at 9–10 (discussing the deficiencies of 
various English translations of “eudaimonia,” including “flourishing,” “happiness,” and “well-being”). 
Noting well Hursthouse’s concerns with the term, I will use “flourishing” throughout this Article. 
66. Id. at 20. On a neo-Aristotelian view, possession of the virtues is only part of human 
flourishing, albeit an essential part. According to Solum, 
Human flourishing consists of lives of rational and social activities that express the human 
excellences. Thus, flourishing is a characteristic of whole lives and not of individual moments. 
Flourishing is a function of activity. This means that mental states, such as pleasure or 
satisfaction are not themselves flourishing – although flourishing may produce such positive 
mental states. Flourishing requires rational activity, because humans are creatures that reason 
and can act on the basis of reasons. Flourishing requires social activity, because humans are 
social creatures who communicate and interact with one another. Finally, flourishing involves 
activities that express the human excellences or virtues. 
Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue as the End of Law: An Aretaic Theory of Legislation, in THE FACES OF 
VIRTUE IN LAW 5, 7 (Amalia Amaya & Claudio Michelon eds., 2020) [hereinafter Solum, Aretaic 
Legislation]. 
67. Kraut, supra note 58, at § 2. 
68. HURSTHOUSE, VIRTUE ETHICS, supra note 15, at 3 (noting this development and pointing 
in particular to examples of virtue-centered work in Kantian ethics).  











B. Moving from Virtue Ethics to Virtue Jurisprudence 
All virtue jurisprudence borrows in some manner from a version of the 
foregoing backstory. For all its diversity, we can divide virtue jurisprudence 
into two broad categories. The first, which I will refer to as “strong virtue 
jurisprudence,” views the law as instrumental to the goal of promoting 
virtue-centered human flourishing (rather than serving to bring about other 
ends, like preference satisfaction or the protection of rights). That is 
precisely the view adopted by Colin Farrelly and Lawrence Solum in their 
early book on virtue jurisprudence,70 a view also attributed both to Aristotle 
and Aquinas.71 What makes this approach “strong” is its commitment to a 
central, underlying assumption in virtue ethics about the relationship 
between the virtues and human flourishing, and its commitment to 
advancing human flourishing through the law.72 Strong virtue jurisprudence 
posits a clear and direct link between the function of the law and the 
promotion of virtue.  
By contrast, other works of virtue jurisprudence take no position on 
human flourishing per se, even as they adopt a virtue-based analysis of some 




70. See FARRELLY & SOLUM, Aretaic Theories, supra note 13. 
71. Robert P. George, The Central Tradition—Its Value and Limits, in VIRTUE 
JURISPRUDENCE 24, 25 (Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2008) [hereinafter, George, Central 
Tradition] (“I shall focus on the perfectionism of Aristotle and Aquinas, the two thinkers who have most 
profoundly influenced the tradition.”). George uses “perfectionism” here to refer to the view that the law 
should help make people moral or virtuous. Thus, another term for what I call “strong virtue 
jurisprudence” might be “perfectionism.” 
72. Other sources noted above also adopt a strong form of virtue jurisprudence. See, e.g., 
Nesteruk, Law, Virtue and the Corporation, supra note 32 (urging readers to acknowledge a role for the 
law “in promoting the moral development of individuals”). 
73. One prominent anthology on virtue jurisprudence is explicit about its embrace of this 
approach: 
Legal scholarship on virtue can pursue different aims and take a variety of forms and 
approaches. It need not adopt a (strictly) virtue-ethical approach to law. Just as it is possible for 
a philosopher to give an account of virtue without being a virtue ethicist, it is possible for a 
lawyer to offer a study of virtue in the legal context without rooting it in virtue ethics. A number 
of chapters in this volume fall into this category. For example, as Michelon makes clear, the 
focus of his essay is not on the relationship between virtue ethics and law as such but on the 
relationship of certain character traits, especially the virtue of practical wisdom, and the process 
of legal decision-making. Similarly, Clark’s project, of which his contribution here forms part, 
does not involve the application of virtue ethics as a tool within law; instead, the aim is to 
establish connections between law, community character and human thriving. 
Amaya & Lai, LAW, VIRTUE & JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 5. Within weak virtue jurisprudence, the basis 
for incorporating virtue analysis is less clear ex ante than it is within strong virtue jurisprudence; the 
methodological choice to deploy a virtue analysis requires some sort of independent justification beyond 
an interest in using the law to promote a particular conception of human flourishing. Much weak virtue 











virtue jurisprudence” because it does not explicitly embrace the traditional 
relationship between the virtues and human flourishing. Consequently, 
weak virtue jurisprudence does not generally or necessarily commit one to 
any overarching purpose or function of the law.   
The distinction matters for present purposes because the argument 
outlined below applies somewhat differently to strong and weak variants of 
virtue jurisprudence. Nevertheless, I will presume in what follows that even 
weak virtue jurisprudence—much like deontological or consequentialist 
work on the virtues in normative ethical theory—reflects a view that virtue 
is a useful and important concept for assessing the lives of individuals, both 
inside and outside of the law.74 To deploy virtue-based analysis of the law 
is to concede that people may manifest character traits that function in some 
morally beneficial way, and that individuating those traits can be a 
meaningful exercise. In other words, if the virtues tell us anything 
meaningful about the proper shape or interpretation of contract law (for 
example), that is presumably because the virtues also tell us something 
meaningful about the people who are subject to contract law. I will also 
presume that individual virtue is theoretically prior to the law—it refers to 
at least some traits that one might possess in a world without law—and thus, 
regardless of the purpose of the legal system, the law can either aid in 




about whether its author accepts virtue-based human flourishing as some sort of intrinsic good, and thus 
it is in fact entirely consistent with an underlying commitment to promoting such an end. See, e.g., 
Robertson, supra note 24, at 743 (purporting to incorporate the virtue of justice—as understood by 
Aristotle—into antitrust regulation, but making no broader commitments to the individual manifestation 
of the virtues by members of the public); Bruckner, supra note 25 (using the virtues to explain features 
of bankruptcy law, and noting that some of those features may conduce to human flourishing, but 
omitting any explicit connection between the form of flourishing in question and the possession of 
virtues by flourishing individuals); Shaffer, supra note 23 (arguing that legal advocates should rely on 
Aristotle’s conception of the virtue of friendship or friendliness to model their relationships with their 
clients, but omitting the deeper view that the purpose of that relationship, as with other parts of the law, 
should be to promote the virtue-centered flourishing of the client or other members of society). It may 
be that some legal scholars drawn to weak virtue jurisprudence simply pass over the question of the 
moral foundation for their choice because they lack developed views on normative ethical theory (or 
virtue ethics more specifically).  
74. In other words, I will disregard the vanishingly small possibility that there exists any strand 
of weak virtue jurisprudence, presently unknown to me, that somehow affirmatively rejects the relevance 
of the moral virtues of individual members of society to its virtue-based analysis of the law. It seems 
implausible that someone could justify adopting a virtue analysis of some element of legal theory while 
denying the relevance of virtue for individuals in their lives outside the legal system. For example, it 
would be difficult to proffer a compelling analysis of the virtues essential to becoming a good judge that 
simultaneously denies that the virtues are meaningful for the private decision-making of parties who 
appear before the judge.  











 This basic conclusion highlights an issue too often passed over in virtue 
jurisprudence: the actual effect of the law, as it is applied, in shaping the 
flourishing (or, at the very least, the virtues and vices) of members of 
society.76 We might call this the “aretaic leap.” In the rush to apply virtue 
analysis to various facets of the law, scholars tend to skip past the relevance 
of the very thing that inspired their methodology: the actual lives of 
individuals.77 The pattern is especially clear in the case of strong virtue 
jurisprudence. If the point of the law is to promote a particular form of 
flourishing among members of society, it would seem impossible to engage 
in meaningful virtue analysis of the law without reckoning with the tangible 
effects of the law on different groups operating under the legal system in 
question, especially to the extent that the system treats some groups 




76. One way to understand this complaint is by analogy to ideal and nonideal theory. In his 
work on constitutional theory, Solum describes the distinction as follows:  
Ideal normative theory asks the enduring questions of constitutional theory by assuming that 
institutions and individuals will act as they should act. Nonideal theories relax these idealizing 
assumptions and ask contextualized questions such as the following: “How should the 
constitution be interpreted by the judges who actually occupy the bench? Is judicial review 
justified in current political circumstances? How have the political branches actually responded 
to the institution of judicial review? 
Solum, The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory, supra note 13, at 476. Similarly, I am arguing that 
idealized virtue analysis of the law, disconnected from the realities of the vices imposed on members of 
society by a biased legal system, is substantially less fruitful than its popularity would seem to suggest.  
77. Notably, some virtue jurisprudence does contend with these issues, but, as noted above, it 
is surprisingly common for scholars to gloss over it. One important exception is Sherman Clark, who 
adopts something like a version of strong virtue jurisprudence that is particularly sensitive to the 
implications of the law for individual virtue. As he puts it, “Instead of using ideas of virtue and character 
as tools within the law – ways of doing law, I see them as potential consequences of law.” Sherman J. 
Clark, Neoclassical Public Virtues: Towards an Aretaic Theory of Law-Making (and Law Teaching), in 
Amaya & Lai, LAW, VIRTUE & JUSTICE, supra note 13. Clark goes on to identify “six overlapping ways 
in which law and politics, whether intentionally or inadvertently, may have an influence on the sorts of 
people we become.” Id. at 83. They include:  
By requiring or prohibiting conduct thought to display or evince traits of character; by requiring 
or prohibiting conduct that might indirectly engender traits; by facilitating (or undercutting) 
institutions that provide fora for the articulation and construction of traits of character; by 
providing (or precluding) opportunities for exemplars to thrive; by providing concrete contexts 
for discussion and argument about what sort of people we are or want to be; and, perhaps most 
subtly and most crucially, by facilitating (or stifling) public conversation about character and 
thriving. 
Id. Recent work by Solum constitutes another important exception. See Solum, Aretaic Legislation, 
supra note 66, at 15 (arguing that “[a] virtue-centered approach [to legislation] must take into account 
the effects produced by criminalization of alcohol, drugs, gambling, and prostitution. If prohibition is 
counterproductive, then human flourishing may best be supported by a regime of decriminalization or 
legalization, accompanied by programs of education, treatment, and support.”).  
78. Solum, for example, has written extensively on the virtues exemplified by a good judge. 
See supra note 22 (identifying three of his articles on the subject); see also Solum, The Aretaic Turn in 











motivator for the aretaic leap in virtue jurisprudence, but I suspect it follows 
largely from two misguided assumptions about the relationship between the 
law and virtue. First, there is a tendency among scholars to work from a 
strong presumption that compliance with the law is (in general) a marker of 
virtue.79 Perhaps relatedly, there has been a general failure to contend with 
the possibility that our legal system (which many regard as reasonably just) 
can make vicious demands to compliance. The argument presented below 
challenges both of those assumptions. 
II. THE VIRTUE OF LAWFULNESS AS A BASELINE 
Notwithstanding the countless possible interpretations of the virtues 
themselves, lawfulness is widely considered a virtue. Legal compliance is 
especially important for strong virtue jurisprudence because, on the views 
of key foundational figures, following the law is essential for conditioning 
people to become virtuous.80 High regard for lawfulness is so common that, 
even though theorists will often recognize some limited class of exceptions, 
presumptions about the value of lawfulness tend to obscure more 




judges and constitutional interpretation). His reasons for doing so appear to include a general 
commitment both to virtue ethics and virtue jurisprudence, paired with his view that the virtues help 
explain the practices of judging better than traditional deontological or consequentialist accounts. With 
respect to the former, see generally FARRELLY & SOLUM, Aretaic Theories, supra note 13 (explaining 
Solum’s view of the general promise of virtue jurisprudence); with respect to the latter, see Solum, 
Judging, supra note 22, at 200–04 (noting in particular the role of practical wisdom in rendering 
judgments in accordance with legal rules and the power of a virtue-centered account to explain the 
possibility that more than one judgment by a judge might be legally correct). He also thinks a virtue-
centered analysis helps explain equity—that is, cases where judicial rulings correct an unfair result that 
may otherwise be compelled by applicable legal rules. See Solum, Judging, supra note 22, at 204–06 
(2003). That is fine as far as it goes, but the virtues exhibited by a person qua judge—incorruptibility, 
wisdom, judicial courage, and so forth—serve a very different function from the virtues exhibited by 
that same person qua human. Per strong virtue jurisprudence, the latter are the ultimate end for anyone 
committed to living a good life (even a person whose job happens to be that of a judge!), while the 
former are merely instrumental; judicial virtues work to facilitate the proper resolution of disputes within 
a legal system designed to promote the human flourishing of everyone subject to it. We might refer to 
judicial virtues, or the virtues of any legal official (such as a good attorney) as “role virtues.” Even on 
Solum’s view, role virtues must play a secondary role in the moral story of society. See G. Alex Sinha, 
Original(ism) Sin, 95 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. __, Section II.B (forthcoming 2021–22) (arguing for this 
proposition). Are role virtues the best way to cash out the responsibilities of officials within a legal 
system aimed at promoting human flourishing? It is certainly possible, but not at all obvious. Indeed, as 
argued in Section III below, some form of equality is essential to human flourishing on a plausible view 
of the virtues, thus suggesting that orienting judges toward the protection of fundamental rights may 
stand as a reasonable alternative candidate.  
79. See infra Section II. 
80. See George, Central Tradition, supra note 71, at 32 (noting that Aquinas “agrees with 
Aristotle that ‘perfection of virtue must be acquired by man by some kind of training’” and quoting 











desirability of lawfulness is a theoretical baseline; deviations require special 
justification. 
That is not an accident. Beyond the special role of the law in strong 
virtue jurisprudence, it seems plausible in the abstract that a general 
propensity to respect or comply with the law could amount to a form of 
virtue. Among other benefits, lawfulness may be pacific, and its possessors 
may avoid certain adverse consequences (especially in the form of 
punishment meted out by the state).81 At minimum, we might expect 
lawfulness to correlate with other virtues even if it does not constitute a 
virtue itself. Nevertheless, as Section III argues, this view warrants greater 
pressure than it typically receives because it tends to obscure the 
relationship between lawfulness and other basic virtues and vices. To 
establish the basis for applying such pressure, it is worth noting some 
especially influential views on the subject—Aristotelian and Thomistic 
versions in particular82—and how those views have shaped contemporary 
debates about the virtue of lawfulness.  
A. Aristotle 
Aristotle places significant emphasis on the virtue of justice,83 a key 
element of which he believed was regard for the law.84 According to Richard 
Kraut, “Aristotle [thought] that justice in its broadest sense can be defined 




81. I discuss the benefits of lawfulness more fully below. See infra Section III.C.1. 
82. Aristotle and Aquinas are a natural pair to highlight because of their surpassing historical 
and contemporary influence on virtue ethics. See Timothy Cantu, Virtue Jurisprudence and the 
American Constitution, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1521, 1522 (2013) (describing the special significance 
of Aristotle and Aquinas in advancing virtue ethics within western cultures). 
83. See Edmundson, Law Abidance, supra note 12, at 4 (noting that, for Aristotle, “[j]ustice is 
the chief virtue”); James W. Guest, Justice as Lawfulness and Equity as a Virtue in Aristotle’s 
‘Nicomachean Ethics,’ 79 REV. POLITICS 1, 1 (2017) (“Aristotle’s inquiry into the human good in the 
Nicomachean Ethics devotes more attention to justice than to any other virtue. . . .”). 
84. Note, however, that there are some complications in distinguishing between Aristotle’s 
views of a personal virtue of justice and the justice of a political arrangement. See LeBar & Slote, supra 
note 62; see also Fred Miller, Aristotle’s Political Theory, § 3, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Jul. 1, 1998, 
rev. Nov. 7, 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-politics/ [https://perma.cc/ZK6H-E3PW] 
(“[I]n the universal sense, ‘justice’ means ‘lawful[n]ess’ and is concerned with the common advantage 
and happiness of the political community. . . . [I]n the particular sense ‘justice’ means ‘equality’ or 
‘fairness’, [encompassing] distributive justice, according to which different individuals have just claims 
to shares of some common asset such as property.”); William A. Haines, Aristotle on the Unity of the 
Just, 19 MÉTHEXIS 57, 57 (2006) (“In the general sense, to have the virtue of justice is to be a lawful 
person. . . . In the special sense, to have the virtue of justice is to be equal or fair.”) (emphasis in original).  
85. Solum, The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory, supra note 13, at 517 (quoting Richard 
Kraut). See also Haines, supra note 84, at 57 (“In the general sense, to have the virtue of justice is to be 











saw these views as based on an assumption that “every community requires 
a high degree of order that comes from having a stable body of customs and 
norms, and a coherent legal code that is not altered frivolously and 
unpredictably.”86 Thus, per Kraut, Aristotle would have privileged the 
comportment of individuals that contributed to the stability of the rules and 
laws of their communities.87 Moreover, as noted above, Aristotle believed 
the coercive power of the law serves an important function in conditioning 
the public to be virtuous.88 
 Some have argued that Aristotle could only offer a “qualified 
endorsement to the idea that obedience [to the law] is a virtue,” noting that 
he “acknowledges that ancient laws can become absurdly obsolete and, 
moreover, that the law’s generality and what justice demands in particular 
cases can diverge.”89 Even so, the scales tilt in favor of legal compliance 
because of the law’s conditioning role and because, for Aristotle, the law 
“has no power to command obedience except that of habit.”90 Such a habit 
would plainly have the value of reinforcing the stability of the community’s 
rules.91 There are complexities and limitations, of course.92 But the mere 




86. Solum, The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory, supra note 13, at 517 (quoting Richard 
Kraut). 
87. Id. Similar reasons compel compliance with informal community norms as well. See id. at 
516. 
88. See George, Central Tradition, supra note 71, at 32. See also id. at 29 (attributing to 
Aristotle the view that, “[g]iven the natural tendency of the majority of people to act on passionate 
motives in preference to reason . . . the law must first settle people down if it is to help them gain . . . 
some grasp of the intrinsic value of morally upright choosing”—and, more specifically, that “[i]t is 
precisely inasmuch as the average man is given to passions that . . . he must be governed by fear of 
punishment”). Note also that Aristotle was heavily influenced by Plato, who arguably took an even 
stronger view on the duty to obey the law. See Julia Annas, Plato on law-abidance and a path to natural 
law 19, 22 in THE FACES OF VIRTUE IN LAW (Amalia Amaya & Claudio Michelon, eds. 2020) (arguing 
that, for Plato, citizens of an ideal city would “think of themselves as slaves to their laws” and that 
“unquestioning obedience” to the law would render them “both . . . ‘rulers’ . . . and ‘ruled’.”) (emphasis 
in original). 
89. Edmundson, Law Abidance, supra note 12, at 4. See also Guest, supra note 83, at 15 
(“Equity[, which is a correction of the legally just,] thus emerges as a virtue that makes the adjustments 
necessary to secure the good when simple obedience to the law cannot. In this way it preserves the spirit 
of justice as lawfulness, which itself was never identified with mere law-abidingness.”).  
90. Edmundson, Law Abidance, supra note 12, at 4 (quoting Aristotle). 
91. See Miller, supra note 84, at § 2 (“Aristotle is also wary of casual political innovation, 
because it can have the deleterious side-effect of undermining the citizens' habit of obeying the law”). 
92. For a more thorough discussion of Aristotle’s views of justice and equity, see Guest, supra 











one’s responsibilities,93 which leads to questionable outcomes where a 
society’s laws or norms are seriously problematic.94  
The Aristotelian position on lawfulness remains influential in 
contemporary virtue jurisprudence. For example, Solum has drawn on 
Aristotle to defend the notion of justice as lawfulness,95 which he argues is 
superior to a conception of justice as fairness.96 More specifically, Solum 
claims that “in a well-ordered society, just humans internalize the laws and 
social norms (the nomoi)[, which is to say that] they internalize lawfulness 
as a disposition that guides the way they relate to other humans.”97 Solum 
attempts to correct for the possibility of societal imperfection. For instance, 
he claims that, “[i]n societies that are mostly well ordered, with isolated 
zones of substantial dysfunction, the nomoi are limited to those norms that 
are not clearly inconsistent with the function of law—to create the 
conditions for human flourishing.” In more dire scenarios, where society is 
“radically dysfunctional,” “humans are thrown back on their own 
resources—doing the best they can in circumstances that may require great 
practical wisdom to avoid evil and achieve good.”98 After narrowing the 
“nomoi” to a morally acceptable subset of “positive laws and stable customs 
and norms,” Solum defines the virtue of justice as lawfulness as a 
disposition “to act in accord with the nomoi . . . in situations . . . where the 
nomoi provide salient reasons for action.”99 This is a view we will revisit 
below. 
B. Aquinas 
 Considering his intellectual importance and continuing influence, it is 




93. See Kraut, supra note 58, at § 5.1(“[A]lthough Aristotle holds that ethics cannot be reduced 
to a system of rules, however complex, he insists that some rules are inviolable.”). 
94. See Solum, The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory, supra note 13, at 517 (noting that 
“[t]he Aristotelean view has problematic implications” because “[the deeply held norms of some 
societies may now strike us as wicked.”).  
95. See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Natural Justice: an Aretaic Account of the Virtue of 
Lawfulness, in VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE 167 (Colin Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2008) 
[hereinafter, Solum, Virtue of Lawfulness]. 
96. See id. at 179–80. Solum is particularly keen to apply this model to judges because he 
thinks “justice as lawfulness” supplies a “public standard of judgment” (as opposed to fairness, views 
about which may differ from judge to judge). Id.  
97. Id. at 167.  
98. Id. at 167–68. 











Aristotle’s philosophy into his own.100 Most importantly for present 
purposes, Aquinas followed Aristotle’s lead on key dimensions of the 
significance and substance of the virtues.101 But, as a Christian theologian, 
Aquinas also departed in important respects from Aristotle.102 Although 
those departures are largely beyond the scope of this Article, Aquinas looms 
large not just in virtue ethics generally,103 but also in Christian104 and 
conservative105 circles specifically. 
Because he accepted much of the relevant Aristotelian framework for 
his view of virtue, as well as the perfectionist purpose of the law,106 
Aquinas’s views on lawfulness are not dissimilar from Aristotle’s, at least 
in the respects relevant here. Once more, there is a strong presumption in 




100. See Ralph McInerny & John O’Callaghan, Saint Thomas Aquinas, § 4, STAN. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., (Jul. 12, 1999, rev. May 23, 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aquinas/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y9ZL-ED5N] (“[Aquinas] adopted Aristotle's analysis of physical objects, his view of 
place, time and motion, his proof of the prime mover, his cosmology. He made his own Aristotle’s 
account of sense perception and intellectual knowledge. His moral philosophy is closely based on what 
he learned from Aristotle. . . .”). 
101. Id. at §§ 12, 12.1 (“Thomas' Moral Doctrine is primarily eudaimonistic and virtue based  
. . . . Thomas' broad account of virtues as excellences or perfections of the various human powers 
formally echoes Aristotle, both with regard to the nature of a virtue and many specific virtues.”). See 
also Finnis, supra note 64, at § 4.1 (“Aquinas accepts Aristotle’s notion that every virtue is a mean 
between too much and too little. . . .”); supra note 64 (quoting Finnis as observing that Aquinas “firmly” 
held the Platonic-Aristotelian view “that to have any of the virtues in its full and proper form one must 
have all of them”). 
102. See McInerny & O’Callaghan, supra note 100, at § 12.1 (noting that “it is a mistake to 
think that [Aquinas] simply repeats Aristotle” in part because of “the theological seting of [Aquinas’] 
work.). See also George, Central Tradition, supra note 71, at 32 (arguing that, in contrast to Aristotle, 
Aquinas offers “a peculiarly Christian rationale” for “the legal enforcement of morality”).  
103. HURSTHOUSE, VIRTUE ETHICS, supra note 15, at 3 (“The modern philosophers whom we 
think of as having put virtue ethics on the map— Anscombe, Foot, Murdoch, Williams, Maclntyre, 
McDowell, Nussbaum, Slote —had all absorbed Plato and Aristotle, and in some cases also Aquinas.”)  
104. See Katherine Archibald, The Concept of Social Hierarchy in the Writings of St. Thomas 
Aquinas, 12 THE HISTORIAN 28, 28 (1949) (“The Church, within which Aquinas labored, has long 
honored him as one of its few supreme philosophers. Less than fifty years after his death he was 
canonized.”) See generally, e.g., Patrick Clark, Is Martyrdom Virtuous? An Occasion for Rethinking the 
Relation of Christ and Virtue in Aquinas, 30 J. SOC’Y CHRISTIAN ETHICS 141 (2010); NICHOLAS 
AUSTIN, AQUINAS ON VIRTUE: A CAUSAL READING (Geo. Univ. Press 2017); Marcia L. Colish, St. 
Thomas Aquinas in Historical Perspective: The Modern Period, 44 CHURCH HIST. 433 (1975); Thomas 
F. O’Meara, O.P., Virtues in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas, 58 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 254 (1997); 
Adriana De Giorgi, Thomas Aquinas Influence on Catholic Church, CHRISTIANITY GLOB. (Jul. 28, 
2019), https://christianity.global/thomas-aquinas [https://perma.cc/QXP5-LWTV]; Ernest L. Fortin, 
Thomas Aquinas as a Political Thinker, 26 PERSPS. ON POL. SCI. 92 (1997). 
105. See, e.g., Lee J. Strang, Originalism and the Aristotelian Tradition: Virtue's Home in 
Originalism, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1997, 2023 (2012) (relying on Aquinas to help ground a virtue-based 
argument in favor of originalist constitutional interpretation). 
106. See McInerny & O’Callaghan, supra note 100. 











as ‘a special kind of sin’” and obedience as ‘a special virtue.’”108 More 
specifically, obedience is valuable because it “promotes the common good,” 
helps to “avoid scandal or danger,” and “provides a means to higher 
virtue.”109 Some have interpreted Aquinas to mean that “it is the obedience 
itself that is required by law and that will lead one to virtue.”110 Another 
scholar observes that “[n]o philosopher since Aquinas . . . has had very 
much to say in favor of the idea that a disposition to obey the law because 
it is the law, or to obey the law ‘as it requires to be obeyed,’ is a virtue.”111  
The key Thomistic exception—which is narrower than it first appears—
concerns unjust laws or commands.112 Man-made laws might be unjust 
because they conflict with the divine law, in which case they “are clearly to 
be disobeyed”; or they might be unjust because they conflict with the human 
good, in which case the story is more complicated.113 Fundamentally, “[i]f 
the law purports to require actions that no-one should ever do, it cannot 
rightly be complied with; one’s moral obligation is not to obey but to 
disobey.”114 By contrast, if man-made law is promulgated improperly in 
certain key respects—from an improper motive, in a manner marred by 
procedural deficiencies, or based on a sufficiently flawed view of the human 
good—the resulting lack of moral authority behind the law may present one 
with the choice of whether to obey it or not.115 Perhaps controversially, one 
scholar has argued that Aquinas could countenance a very specific form of 
civil disobedience: the altruistic disobedience of an unjust system of rule.116  
But even if we credit these potential limitations, their general thrust is 
weak. First, Aquinas would likely be skeptical of forms of law-breaking that 




108. Scholz, supra note 7, at 449. 
109. Id. at 457. 
110. See Scholz, supra note 7, at 457 (citing E.A. Goerner) (emphasis added). 
111. Edmundson, Law Abidance, supra note 12, at 10. 
112. See Scholz, supra note 7, at 453 (“In deciding to disobey a law, one must first judge it to 
be unjust.”). Aquinas was also sensitive to the consequences of imposing excessively onerous legal 
demands on the population, which could generate “resentment” or “even rebellion,” although that 
observation does not constitute a limitation on the virtue of obedience per se. George, Central Tradition, 
supra note 71, at 35. 
113. Scholz, supra note 7, at 453.  
114. Finnis, supra note 64, at § 7.5. 
115. Id. 
116. See Scholz, supra note 7, at 452. Scholz’s essay responds to an interpretation of Aquinas 
offered by Katherine Archibald, which (in Scholz’s words) argued that “to do other than obey one’s 
superior [is] a sin.” Id. at 461. Archibald’s argument appears in an article that explores Aquinas’s views 
on social hierarchy, including his views on the subservience of serfs and women. See generally 











the “public, conscientious, nonviolent refusal to comply”117 with an unjust 
system. Moreover, Aquinas recognized the possibility that one ought to 
obey unjust laws or even unjust systems of law when “to do otherwise would 
do more harm than good.”118 To be justified, therefore, noncompliance must 
not only be public, conscientious, and nonviolent, but also carefully 
calculated as a method of last resort for opposing unjust demands, factoring 
in the detrimental weight that one’s acts of resistance would have for 
“overall respect for the law.”119 Additionally, Aquinas would arguably have 
required the basis for disobedience to flow from the one’s conviction that 
law-breaking served a particular conception of the common good. This 
limitation rules out “selfish” law-breaking designed to “promote [one’s] 
own interest or to appease [one’s] own conscience” even if the law being 
broken “places an unfair burden” on the law-breaker.120 In short, we would 
not expect contemporary invocations of Aquinas to ground a more 




117. See Scholz, supra note 7, at 451. According to Scholz, 
The disobedient action must be conscientious because it is only through virtuous reasoning that 
one may disobey a human law in order to comply with the natural law . . . [It] must be 
nonviolent because to disobey through violent means would bring about more evil than to obey 
the unjust law[; and it] must be public, because otherwise this would indicate that one’s actions 
do not have the common good as the sole purpose.  
Id. at 451–52. 
118. Scholz, supra note 7, at 458. See also id. at 460–61 (“[E]ither the system is corrupt or the 
law is corrupt. If it is the law that is corrupt then the system still works for the common good and the 
subject ought to continue to obey it. In addition, greater harm might result from doing otherwise.”).  
119. Id. at 458. 
120. Id. at 459–60.  
121. As noted above, the opposite is quite predictably the case. Aquinas is a popular influence 
for more conservative political views. See supra note 38 (highlighting some examples). Developments 
since the Black Lives Matter protests in the summer of 2020 may catalyze a shift away from conservative 
defenses of lawfulness, but that remains to be seen. For example, on January 6, 2021, hundreds of 
supporters of President Trump broke into the U.S. Capitol, ransacking the Capitol building and 
assaulting Capitol Police. Martha Mendoza & Juliet Linderman, Officers Maced, Trampled: Docs 
Expose Depth of Jan. 6 Chaos, AP NEWS (Mar. 10, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/docs-expose-
depth-january–6-capitol-siege-chaos-fd3204574c11e453be8fb4e3c81258c3 (noting both the damage to 
the Capitol and the injuries inflicted on members of the Capitol Police); Zoe Tillman, Ken Bensinger & 
Jessica Garrison, Hundreds Of People Who Joined The Capitol Riot May Never Face Charges, 
BUZZFEED NEWS (Mar. 16, 2021), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/zoetillman/capitol-riot-
hundreds-not-arrested (estimating that 800 people breached the Capitol on January 6). Their aim was to 
stop Joe Biden’s certification as president following his electoral victory in November of 2020. Alex 
Moe, Adam Edelman & Tom Winter, Capitol Police Ignored Intelligence Warnings Ahead of Jan. 6 
Riots, Watchdog Report Finds, NBC NEWS (Apr. 15, 2021), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/capitol-police-ignored-intelligence-warnings-ahead-jan–
6-riots-watchdog-n1264054. In the first three months following the riot, nearly four hundred participants 
had been identified and charged “for entering the Capitol or for crimes related to weapons or violence.” 
Rachel Axon et al., Capitol Riot Arrests: See Who’s Been Charged Across the U.S., USA TODAY (Apr. 
16, 2021), https://www.usatoday.com/storytelling/capitol-riot-mob-arrests/ (last visited April 16, 2021). 











C. Law-Abidance Versus Law-Obedience 
William Edmundson offers a more recent variation on the theme of this 
Section, presenting a nuanced argument that “law-abidance” constitutes a 
virtue.122 According to Edmundson, 
The virtue of law-abidance is a complex character trait whose core 
consists in the actor’s acceptance of a duty to comply with . . . ‘retail’ 
operations of the legal system, a disposition so to comply, and a 
disposition to regard the bare unlawfulness of an action as a nontrivial 
and normally adequate though not necessarily conclusive reason 
against performing it. The virtue does not, however, comprise a 
disposition to obey the law qua law, regardless of its moral merits; 
although it does include a disposition to conform to the not-patently-
unjust conventional moral norms of the actor’s society—especially 
where those norms constitute customary law.123   
A key element of Edmundson’s view is a distinction between “retail” 
operations of the law and “wholesale” ones. Retail operations “are specific 
interferences with the ongoing stream of conduct by specific measures 
focused on individuals—such as issuing a subpoena or a summons, 
revoking a license, making a traffic stop or an arrest or a judicial sale.”124 
By contrast, wholesale operations primarily involve “prescribing general 
rules, typically by legislative enactment, administrative rulemaking, or 
adjudicatory precedent,” and thus “[t]hey are general with respect both to 
the kind of behavior they concern and the persons they are intended to 
affect.”125 I will follow Edmundson in adopting this distinction below.  
Separating retail and wholesale operations of the legal system sets up a 
further distinction for Edmundson between law-abidance and law-
obedience. For Edmundson, a virtue of obedience requires a disposition to 
obey the law in a manner that is less discerning than law-abidance.126 
Edmundson claims that a virtue of obedience would have to derive from a 




invoking various virtues. This Article is not the proper venue for a comprehensive treatment of such a 
suggestion. Suffice it to say that the argument for virtuous law-breaking offered below is based on 
systemic disadvantage and self-respect—factors that do not appear relevant to the conduct of the January 
6 rioters. To justify their conduct by appeal to the virtues, they will need to look elsewhere. 
122. See generally Edmundson, Law Abidance, supra note 12. 
123. Id. at 2. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 











controversies attending” such a duty.127  Abidance, by contrast, “does not 
presuppose the existence of any duty to obey the law qua law,”128 and the 
law-abiding “need not have a well-settled disposition toward statutory or 
judge-made law in bulk.”129 In moving toward abidance, then, Edmundson 
seeks to leave behind the generic obligation to obey the law that grounds 
much of the earlier work in this area.130 
Shifting from a virtue of obedience to a virtue of abidance appears to 
open the door to some virtuous law-breaking.131 However, Edmundson 
promptly limits that possibility by arguing that those possessing the virtue 
of law abidance will nearly always comply “with direct orders” issuing from 
legal authorities, “except in those rare cases in which noncompliance is the 
only way to initiate review of the justice of a law or official policy.”132 In 
general, law-abiding people “willingly defer to officials as they conduct the 
state’s retail operations.”133 People may even comply when they “face a 
direct order to submit to the administration of what they view as a morally 
flawed law”; at worst, they will “openly and peacefully pursue whatever 
channels there may be for redress.”134 Moreover, “[t]he law-abiding also 
willingly comply with the not-outrageously-unjust informal norms that 






129. Id. at 8. 
130. See infra text accompanying notes 140–47.  
131. Edmundson seems to have in mind a specific form of civil disobedience, what he calls a 
“petition view,” on which disobedience is “public, nonviolent, and . . . intended as an appeal to officials 
and fellow citizens to reconsider and rectify what is in fact a serious injustice.” Edmundson, Law 
Abidance, supra note 12, at 7. Edmundson believes—incorrectly, I will argue below—that the virtue of 
abidance can properly account for a petition view of civil disobedience, which renders abidance superior 
to the more deferential virtue of obedience. Edmundson articulates the trouble with a virtue of obedience 
as follows:  
Obviously, if one has taken the position that obeying the law is a virtue, one is going to have 
difficulty explaining how disobeying the law might be not only permissible but virtuous. For if 
obeying is sometimes right and disobeying is sometimes right, it would appear that what is 
really at work is some virtue to be characterized generally enough to cover both the rightful 
obeyings and the rightful disobeyings. 
Edmundson, Law Abidance, supra note 12, at 7. 
132. Id. at 3. 
133. Id. at 8.  
134. Id. at 2. Edmundson also claims that the law-abiding (among others) “will normally be 
entitled to assume that officials with whom they deal act in good faith whenever they act under the color 
of office.” Id. at 8. But “[p]atent bad faith, like other defeating conditions, may relieve the law-abiding 
of their (defeasible) duty of compliance. Where official corruption is so endemic that connivance is the 
customary social norm, the law-abiding may be disposed to ‘go along to get along.’” Id. 











Edmundson believes law-abidance rises to the level of a virtue for a 
variety of reasons, including its plausibility as a disposition, its perceived 
prominence in ordinary moral education, its ostensible benefits to its 
possessor, and its propensity to fit with other virtues, such as honesty and 
fairness.136 Nevertheless, for all the distance Edmundson attempts to place 
between abidance and obedience, both notions credit their possessors for a 
high degree of deference to the legal system. For example, abidance 
purportedly differs from obedience in its connection with sociability, which 
Edmundson sees as a “helpful and healthy trait.”137 But, by Edmundson’s 
admission, to be sociable “is a matter of putting up with others and getting 
along with them [and] is even, sometimes, a matter of doing what they say 
to do just because they say so.”138 I will return to Edmundson’s view 
below.139  
III. SELF-RESPECT, RESENTMENT, AND DEFIANCE  
 Although the virtue of lawfulness can be understood in a variety of 
ways, its widespread and almost uncritical acceptance sets a baseline that 
has anchored theoretical inquiry into the relationship between law and 
virtue. Law-breaking is prima facie vicious—or, at minimum, certainly not 
virtuous—unless it meets a very specific set of exceptional criteria. As the 
Introduction noted, however, scholars have engaged at length with the 
question of whether individuals operate under a generic duty to obey the 
law (and thus, whether breaking the law generally violates some standing 
duty).140 That latter debate continues, in fact, and Edmundson summarizes 




136. Id. at 3.   
137. Id. at 11. 
138. Id. 
139. Edmundson’s view builds from a rather preliminary sketch of the “virtue of civility” 
sketched out by Leslie Green. See id. at 6. For Green’s account, see LESLIE GREEN, THE AUTHORITY OF 
THE STATE (Oxford Univ. Press 1988) at 263–67. I focus on Edmundson’s view, which is much more 
developed, but Green’s view presages some of the features of Edmundson’s, noting that “self-restraint” 
services stability, and may provide a form of social solidarity. Id. at 265–66. 
140. For a sampling of important contributions to this debate, see ALAN JOHN SIMMONS, 
MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS (Princeton U. Press 1979); William A. Edmundson, 
State of the Art: The Duty to Obey the Law, 10 LEGAL THEORY 215, 215 (2004) [hereinafter Edmundson, 
Duty to Obey]; ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM (U. Cal. Press 1998) (1970); M.B.E. 
Smith, Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law? 82 YALE L.J. 950 (1973); Rolf Sartorius, 
Political Authority and Political Obligation, 67 VA. L. REV. 3 (1981); Joseph Raz, The Obligation to 
Obey: Revision & Tradition, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 139 (1984); Jeremy Waldron, 
Special Ties and Natural Duties, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1993); Kent Greenawalt, The Natural Duty to 











For centuries, political and legal theorists have pondered whether 
each person is under a general obligation of obedience to the legal 
norms of the society wherein he or she lives. The obligation at issue 
in those theorists’ discussions is usually taken to be prima-facie, 
comprehensively applicable, universally borne, and content-
independent.141  
These four elements of the duty at the center of the traditional debate—that 
it is “prima facie, comprehensively applicable, universally borne, and 
content-independent”—reveal the narrow focus of the dominant discussion 
and highlight the ways in which a virtue-based analysis can shed much-
needed light on new dimensions of the relationship between individuals and 
the law. The duty to obey is typically understood as prima facie in the sense 
that it is not absolute, although the fact that a course of action is required by 
law “is not . . . regarded merely as one morally relevant consideration among 
others but as one that is ordinarily decisive and as one toward which 
deference is worth cultivating.”142 The duty is “comprehensively 
applicable” in that “it attaches to all of a jurisdiction's mandatory laws,” or 
at least those that compel a particular course of action and are backed by 
nontrivial penalties for noncompliance.143 The duty is “universally borne” 
because “it purports to apply to each and every one of those to whom the 
jurisdiction’s mandatory laws are directed and who would be exposed to the 
possibility of sanction for noncompliance.”144 And the duty is “content-
independent” in that its “existence . . . is not a direct function of the moral 
merit of the particular law in question.”145  
From the standpoint of human virtue, these parameters screen out the 
most interesting and relevant considerations. What the virtues demand of 
any individual—what is courageous or generous or wise—is largely a 
function of her disposition and circumstances. Moreover, as the following 
subsection explores, people within large and diverse societies are simply not 
similarly positioned before the law; the moral force of even the most general 
legal commands plausibly differs widely across the population. Thus, 
although there is merit in exploring generic duties of obedience, limiting 




141. Edmundson, Duty to Obey, supra note 140 (quoting Matthew Kramer). 
142. Id. at 215–16. Edmundson acknowledges that the debate over the duty to obey the law 
typically adopts W.D. Ross’ formulation of prima facie duty, but Edmundson himself prefers the phrase 
“pro tanto duty.” See id. at 215. 













universally borne requires blurring out the details that confront any given 
individual contending with her relationship to the law. It is particularly 
interesting that virtue theorists who adopt a strong version of the virtue of 
lawfulness also pass over this fact, even though their methodology permits 
them to address it head on. Similarly, the duty to obey the law as law—
independent of the law’s content—precludes the salient possibility that the 
virtuousness or viciousness of disobeying laws depends in significant part 
on what they require.146  
Given the voluminous scholarship on the duty to obey the law, and 
especially the various bases scholars have advanced for skepticism toward 
such a duty,147 the absence of a well-developed, analogous position within 
the realm of virtue is striking. In contrast to the broad theoretical bases 
purportedly justifying the duty to obey the law, we can expect numerous, 
more tailored candidates justifying virtuous resistance of the law. This 
Section explores one such basis grounded in the self-respect of individuals 
experiencing systemic disadvantage pegged to ascribed or morally 
irrelevant characteristics. More specifically, it utilizes self-respect as a 
foundational moral notion that must be accounted for in any theorist’s 
schema of the virtues, whether as a stand-alone virtue or as an important 
component of some other virtue. 
A. Systemically Disadvantaged Groups 
For present purposes, I will adopt Cass Sunstein’s definition of 
“systemic disadvantage,” though modest deviations from that definition will 
not have material implications for the arguments advanced here. For 
Sunstein,  
 
[A] systemic disadvantage is one that operates along standard 
and predictable lines, in multiple important spheres of life, and 
that applies in realms like education, freedom from private and 
public violence, wealth, political representation, and political 
influence, all of which go to basic participation as a citizen in a 





146. The presumption that the generic obligation to obey is hefty by default (even if not 
absolute) begs the question. As Section II suggests, however, many virtue theorists seem to build a 
similar presumption into their views as well.   
147. See WOLFF, supra note 140; Smith, supra note 140; Sartorius, supra note 140. 











Many groups in the United States have long histories of confronting 
systemic disadvantage,149 though the specific manifestations and 
implications of those disadvantages vary by group.150 Sunstein notes that 
race, sex, and disability discrimination create exactly this type of 
disadvantage.151 The same is likely true for members of the LGBTQ 
community, certain religious minorities, and others. Copious literature 
documents the ways in which different groups encounter and experience 




149. See, e.g., Patrick Sharkey, Keeanga-Yamhatta Taylor & Yarnya Serkez, The Gaps Between 
White and Black America, In Charts, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 19, 2020) 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/06/19/opinion/politics/opportunity-gaps-race-
inequality.html [https://perma.cc/TT34-M4HR] (documenting differences between whites and Blacks 
on numerous axes, including incarceration rates, homeownership rates, household income, life 
expectancy, educational attainment, and unemployment rates). 
150. Simultaneous membership in more than one disadvantaged group may generate an 
especially distinctive and serious set of challenges, often explored under the label of “intersectionality.” 
See Anna Carastathis, The Concept of Intersectionality in Feminist History, 9 PHIL. COMPASS 304, 305 
(2014) (attributing the concept of intersectionality to Kimberlé Crenshaw, who described it initially as 
“a metaphor [capturing] the way all of these systems of oppression overlap”). 
151. Sunstein, supra note 148, at 771. For this reason, the specific examples invoked below may 
not apply to all groups that have a basis in self-respect to resist the law. Nevertheless, the structural 
similarity in the root of such disadvantage has led some scholars to explore the ways in which invoking 
efforts to address one base of systemic disadvantage may shed light on addressing others. See, e.g., 
Kimani Paul-Emile, Blackness As Disability?, 106 GEO. L.J. 293 (2018) (using disability law as “an 
analytical lens for examining race and as a practical means for addressing discrimination and structural 
inequality” experienced by Black people in the United States). 
152. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (The New Press 2012) (documenting many systemic disadvantages faced by 
Black people in the United States today and arguing for understanding the place of Black people in 
society as reflecting a “new racial caste system”); CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: 
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 30–31 (Harv. U. Press 1987) (identifying some indicia of systemic 
disadvantage suffered by women in the United States); Kae Greenberg, Still Hidden in the Closet: Trans 
Women and Domestic Violence, 27 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 198, 201 (2012) (discussing the 
significant vulnerability of trans women to domestic violence, and linking that vulnerability to 
mismatches between their legally-recognized gender and their access to “services and benefits”).  For 
literature concerning the systemic disadvantage of people with disabilities (both physical and mental), 
see Dianne Pothier, Tackling Disability Discrimination at Work: Toward a Systemic Approach, 4 
MCGILL J.L. & HEALTH 17 (2010); Stewart J. Schwab & Steven L. Willborn, Reasonable 
Accommodation of Workplace Disabilities, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1197 (2003); Bill Ong Hing, 
Systemic Failure: Mental Illness, Detention, and Deportation, 16 U. C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 341 
(2009). For discussion of disadvantages facing Native Americans, see Erin A. Cech, Jessi L. Smith & 
Anneke Metz, Cultural Processes of Ethnoracial Disadvantage Among Native American College 
Students, 98 SOCIAL FORCES 355 (2018) (examining ethnoracial bias and inequality toward Native 
Americans in the United States); Michael J. Leiber, A Comparison of Juvenile Court Outcomes for 
Native Americans, African Americans, and Whites, 11 JUST. Q. 257 (1994) (analyzing court outcomes 
for white people and Black people relative to Native Americans and noting the general lack of literature 
on the disadvantages of Native Americans). For disadvantages of religious minorities, see Catherine 
M.A. McCauliff, Religion and the Secular State, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 31 (2010); Daniel P. Tokaji, 











Variable manifestations of these disadvantages can (and often do) 
compound for enhanced effect.153 As Sunstein argues, “When combined 
with social practices, difference has the effect of systematically 
subordinating the relevant group and of doing so in multiple spheres and 
along multiple indices of social welfare: poverty, education, political power, 
employment, susceptibility to violence and crime, and so forth.”154 These 
disadvantages may accrue not only across different facets of a person’s 
life—housing, education, income—but also longitudinally, over the 
duration of one’s life or across generations within families or 
communities.155 
A couple further features of such groups are especially relevant for 
present purposes.  First, their disadvantages stem from morally irrelevant 
characteristics; they are not deserved by members of these groups as 
members of these groups.156 Second, these disadvantages result both from 
the aggregate effect of private interactions with prejudiced members of 
society and from the effects of government policy in general (and the 
operations of the legal system in particular).157 Accordingly, I will use the 
term “systemically disadvantaged group” to refer to any group that meets 
the following criteria: 1) the group has faced, and continues to face, a 
substantial level of disadvantage relative to comparable members of better-
off groups; 2) the individuating characteristic(s) that designate(s) members 
of the group or predict their differential treatment—race, sex, sexual 
orientation, whatever—provide(s) an inadequate moral basis for justifying 
the differential treatment members of the group actually experience; and 3) 




(2019) (arguing that the results of the 2017–18 Supreme Court term exacerbated systemic disadvantage 
concerning voting, speech, and religion). 
153. See, e.g., Michelle A. Williams & Jeffrey Sánchez, Racism is Killing Black People. It’s 
Sickening Them, Too, WASH. POST (Jun. 4, 2020),   https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/racism-
is-killing-black-people-its-sickening-them-too/2020/06/04/fe004cc8-a681–11ea-b619–
3f9133bbb482_story.html [https://perma.cc/48GE-SHE8 ] (arguing that racial discrimination directly 
contributes to worse health outcomes for Black Americans); Alyssa Fowers & William Wan, Depression 
and Anxiety Spiked Among Black Americans After George Floyd’s Death, WASH. POST (Jun. 12, 2020),  
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/06/12/mental-health-george-floyd-census/?arc404=true 
[https://perma.cc/HD4S-DDEY] (reporting an increase in anxiety and depression among Black 
Americans and Asian Americans in the days following the death of George Floyd, even as rates remained 
flat among whites and decreased among Latin Americans). 
154. Sunstein, supra note 148, at 771. 
155. See generally David Lyons, Reparations and Equal Opportunity, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD 
L.J. 177 (2004) (tracing centuries of severe discrimination faced by Black people in the United States). 
156. See Sunstein, supra note 148, at 770–71. 
157. I do not mean to foreclose the possibility that the law should do more to regulate private 
discrimination so much as to draw out a spectrum of scenarios defined by the extent of the direct 











nontrivial part to state or federal government (in)action, including through 
the law.158 
Let us take a specific example of a systemically disadvantaged group. 
Federal law (and certainly the federal government more broadly) has been 
complicit for decades in building generations of cumulative disadvantage 
for Black people in the United States.159 Many of those disadvantages persist 
today, as noted above.160 State law has played—and continues to play—a 
significant role as well, even as it too must generally purport to be race-
neutral.161 This discrimination remains pervasive and serious enough that it 
has even invited the recent attention of international human rights bodies.162  
Consider policing, which is addressed primarily under relevant state 
laws163 and constitutes one especially prominent dimension along which 




158. The stronger one can characterize a group’s disadvantage, the firmer the footing for the 
argument presented here. Of course, whether a group has been sufficiently disadvantaged—and 
presently continues to be—may be a contested question, and the ways in which that disadvantage 
manifests may differ from group to group. I have also left some ambiguity about how much 
disadvantage is “sufficient”; and even if I had not, there could be close cases at the margins. That is 
neither here nor there, but the following subsection will help to supply a sharper sense of how to assess 
the meaning of the term “sufficient.” 
159.  See Lyons, supra note 155, at 182 (arguing that “federal policy supported slavery before 
the Civil War” and that the federal government neglected to secure substantive equality thereafter by 
“violat[ing] or fail[ing] to enforce relevant federal law.”). See also Kriston McIntosh, Emily Moss, Ryan 
Nunn & Jay Shambaugh, Examining the Black-White Wealth Gap, BROOKINGS (Feb. 27, 2020), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/02/27/examining-the-black-white-wealth-gap/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z9SP–7LEG] (noting that, “[a]t $171,000, the net worth of a typical white family is 
nearly ten times greater than that of a Black family ($17,150) in 2016” and attributing that differential 
to “accumulated inequality and discrimination, as well as differences in power and opportunity that can 
be traced back to this nation’s inception”—a reflection of “a society that has not and does not afford 
equality of opportunity to all its citizens”). 
 160. See Sharkey et al., The Gaps Between White and Black America, In Charts, supra note 
149 (documenting these ongoing disadvantages along multiple dimensions). 
161. See Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny, 
48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355, 393–94 (2006) (noting that the Supreme Court applies strict scrutiny, its 
“most stringent level of judicial review,” to government action that treats individuals differently on the 
basis of race). Siegel’s article traces the origins of strict scrutiny to First Amendment disputes that arose 
in the 1950s and 1960s. Id. at 355–56. 
162. Jamil Dakwar (@jdakwar), TWITTER (Jun. 16, 2020, 2:40 AM), 
https://twitter.com/jdakwar/status/1272780978713477120?s=20 [https://perma.cc/29A4–9QT4]  
(reporting that “[t]he UN expert on racism and the . . . UN Working Group of Experts on People of 
African Descent sent a letter to [the UN Human Rights Council] calling for the establishment of a 
commission of inquiry on systemic racism and law enforcement in the United States” and sharing images 
of the letter). 
163. See Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 803 (2012) 
(noting that, although “federal regulation of police conduct outside of the Fourth Amendment and 
Miranda doctrine is considerable[, s]tate constitutions, statutes, and regulations regulate police conduct 
even more extensively”). 
164. For a historian’s account of policing as “protect[ing] white privileges in America,” see 











Numerous studies have shown that police target people of color more 
frequently and more aggressively than they target whites.165 For example, 
Black people (and Latinos) are more likely to be pulled over by police while 
driving (during the day, in particular—when their skin color is visible to 
officers); they are more likely to be searched once pulled over; and they are 
more likely than their white counterparts to be killed by police.166 These 
disparities carry over into adjudication and sentencing for criminal offenses. 
Relative to whites, Black people are not only arrested at higher rates, but 
also imprisoned at higher rates, and (even controlling for variables like 
previous criminal record and offense severity) given longer sentences.167 
Black people also face systemic barriers to molding a fairer justice system. 
For example, they must wait much longer than whites to cast ballots168 and 
are more likely than whites to be disenfranchised by both formal and 
informal forces.169 This leads to diminished power to effect political 
change—power that is already limited by default in many cases because 




2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/platform/amp/2020/6/6/21280643/police-brutality-violence-
protests-racism-khalil-muhammad?__twitter_impression=true [https://perma.cc/5HL3-JLQL]. 
165. See Radley Balko, There’s Overwhelming Evidence that the Criminal Justice System is 
Racist. Here’s the Proof., WASH. POST (Jun. 10, 2020),  
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/opinions/systemic-racism-police-evidence-criminal-
justice-system/#Policing [https://perma.cc/ZJ5M-BRCF ] (collecting studies). 
166. See id. See also U.S. Comm’n on Civ. Rts., Transmittal Letter on 2017 Statutory 
Enforcement Report, Targeted Fines and Fees Against Communities of Color: Civil Rights & 
Constitutional Implications (Sept. 2017), 
https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/2017/Statutory_Enforcement_Report2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/SB6H-
Y9NP] (finding “that unchecked discretion or stringent requirements to impose fines or fees can lead 
and have led to discrimination and inequitable access to justice….”).  
167. See Ryan D. King & Michael T. Light, Have Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Sentencing 
Declined?, 48 CRIME & JUST. 365, 366–68 (2019). 
168. See Adam Harris, The Voting Disaster Ahead, ATLANTIC (June 30, 2020), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/06/voter-suppression-novembers-looming-election-
crisis/613408/ [https://perma.cc/FDX2-Y6ER] (noting that “Black voters, on average, wait 45 percent 
longer to vote than white voters; Latino voters wait 46 percent longer.”). 
169. See Vann R. Newkirk II, Voter Suppression Is Warping Democracy, ATLANTIC (July 17, 
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/07/poll-prri-voter-suppression/565355/ 
[https://perma.cc/RS5M–2YPB] (noting that Blacks and Hispanics are, inter alia, substantially more 
likely than whites to lack identification required by law for voting, to be told incorrectly that they are 
not listed on voting rolls, to have difficulty finding polling locations, and to have difficulty getting time 
off from work to cast a ballot). 
170. See Sonya Rastogi, Tallese D. Johnson, Elizabeth M. Hoeffel & Malcom P. Drewery, Jr., 
The Black Population: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 2011), 
https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br–06.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RAT–4JTC] (noting 
that, per the 2010 census, the Black population ranges widely from state to state, but does not exceed 
37.6% of any state’s population, and often constitutes closer to 1%). Note, however, that Black people 
constitute a bare majority (52.2%) of the population of the District of Columbia. Id. See also Press 











Black people clearly meet the proposed definition of a systemically 
disadvantaged group. First, they remain seriously disadvantaged in the 
United States; second, their status as Black people provides no reasonable 
moral justification for the worse life outcomes they demonstrably 
encounter; third, the law itself plays a significant role in imposing and 
reinforcing their disadvantages. I will argue below that groups satisfying 
these criteria may adopt a uniquely negative attitude toward the law as a 
whole,171 and, further, that these criteria lower the threshold for such 
individuals to infer that particular operations of the law discriminate against 
them.172 With respect to the second of these criteria, I simply take it as 
axiomatic that neither skin color nor place of ancestry supplies society with 
a reasonable basis for systematically providing fewer opportunities or 
resources to a particular person or group of people. I make similar 
assumptions about sex, gender, religious views, and sexual orientation. Not 
everyone will share my assumptions, but those assumptions are not essential 
to the validity of this Article’s broader argument. It is likely that numerous 
other groups qualify as systemically disadvantaged as well,173 but we need 
not generate an exhaustive list here so long as we recognize that some such 
groups exist.  
B. Virtue and Self-Respect  
On a virtue-based analysis, how ought members of a systemically 
disadvantaged group respond to the demands of the legal system? Surely it 
depends in large part on the particulars of their situations. For example, it 
may depend on how they identify vis-à-vis any systemically disadvantaged 
group, whether they accept that they have been systemically disadvantaged 
(at least in part by the law), whether they work for the legal system 
themselves, whether resistance comes with especially high costs given their 
competing obligations, whether society has conditioned in them a particular 
attitude toward the law, and so forth—not to mention on which legal 
demands are at issue. No blanket rule is available, but nor is one necessary. 






[https://perma.cc/CB7F-R853] (noting that, per the 2010 census, whites made up 72% of the national 
population while Blacks made up 13%).  
171. See infra Section III.B. 
172. See infra Section III.B. 











Yet a powerful and simple claim stands above that complexity: namely, 
it is incorrect as a matter of virtue to demand that members of such groups 
acquiesce to the law at the level that virtue theorists (especially proponents 
of the virtue of lawfulness) typically expect. Put another way, it is well 
within the range of virtuous responses to the law that members of 
systemically disadvantaged groups resent parts of the law and, in certain 
situations, actively decline to comply with it.174 In fact, because the legal 
system itself plays a role in their systematic disadvantage, to expect such 
individuals to regard the law favorably may at times be vicious. I will argue 
that the traditional accounts of when it is acceptable to deviate from the law, 
often expressed as exceptions to the virtue of lawfulness, cannot fully 
explain why this is the case.  
We can tell the story of virtuous opposition to the law among 
systemically disadvantaged groups in terms of several widely-accepted 
virtues (such as self-respect, pride, or righteous indignation) and vices (such 
as servility). I will use the term “self-respect” to stand in for the moral 
quality that supports this form of resistance to the law. To be clear, this 
Article does not seek to develop a novel account of some particular virtue 
or vice that one must accept as a precondition for the specific brand of 
virtuous law-breaking contemplated here. I want to make a stronger and 
broader claim: on any plausible account of human morality that takes the 
virtues seriously, self-respect must either constitute its own virtue or, as a 
core moral notion, must be embedded in other virtues. Therefore, under 
effectively any form of virtue jurisprudence, self-respect will provide a 
basis in virtue for members of systemically disadvantaged groups to resist 
portions of the law.175  
I noted above that virtue ethicists disagree both about which qualities 
amount to virtues and about how to define the virtues they do agree to 
accept.176 But a plausible account of the virtues incorporates the notion of 
self-respect, or some recognition that flourishing individuals recognize their 




174. I will refer here to a justified posture of “resisting” the law, which encompasses both an 
attitude of disapproval of the law and (at times) a refusal to comply with it. I address the attitudinal 
component and the compliance component separately below. 
175. That does not mean that members of systemically disadvantaged groups have a sweeping 
license to violate the law, but rather that some uncontroversial account of virtue will count in favor of 
their taking a dim view of the law and, depending on the circumstances, may warrant their breaking the 
law all things considered.  
176. See supra Section I.A. 
177. We can see this quality shade into descriptions of other virtues as well, such as generosity. 
See HURSTHOUSE, VIRTUE ETHICS, supra note 15, at 13 (arguing that one does not “count as mean or 











notion manifests through the virtues of pride178 or righteous indignation.179 
For a Christian-inspired list of virtues, self-worth could be implied by a 
view of humility as a golden mean lying between excessive pride or 
arrogance on one hand and excessively low estimates of one’s merits on the 
other.180 Even theorists who do not adopt wholesale a virtue ethical 
approach have acknowledged the importance of honoring our self-worth,181 
perhaps as a reflection of our inherent dignity.182 Regardless of the precise 
label for it, any compelling view of the virtues must find some way to 
account for the importance of self-respect. 
 It is difficult to discern in absolute terms what a society owes to each 
individual within it. But even a generic and relatively thin view of self-
respect grounds an individual’s expectation that her state (and its legal 
system) will provide for reasonable parity among its subjects, especially 
absent morally-relevant differences. Ex hypothesi, this is not the situation 
facing systemically disadvantaged groups. At a general level, the law 
perpetuates a state of affairs that is unfavorable to members of those groups, 
and, although the law purports to make neutral claims on each of us, it in 




several vices or failings, and generosity contrasts not only with meanness or selfishness but also with 
being prodigal, too open-handed, a sucker.”). 
178. See Robert Sokolowski, Friendship and Moral Action in Aristotle, 35 J. VALUE INQUIRY 
355, 356 (2001) (arguing that “pride comes after the moral virtues and is more like a form of knowledge 
than a specified disposition to perform. . . . Without pride, the other moral virtues would be incomplete 
and even incoherent. They would be excellences that are unaware of themselves and hence unable to 
engage in actions.”). 
179. William W. Fortenbaugh, Aristotle and the Questionable Means-Dispositions, 99 
TRANSACTIONS & PROC. AM. PHILOLOGICAL ASS’N 203, 206 (1968) (“[A] righteously indignant man 
feels indignation and is said to be pained . . . at unmerited success or misfortune.”) 
180. See, e.g., James Kellenberger, Humility, 47 AM. PHIL. Q. 321, 326 (2010) (discussing 
Aquinas’s view of humility as a religious virtue). Although certain Christian conceptions of humility 
might be “presented as self-abasement or experiencing yourself as filth,” id. at 331, Aquinas seems to 
regard it as a restraint on the “inordinate urge for things above us” or a “recognition . . . of our position 
in relation to other things,” id. at 332. Even if one believes that individual members of society are nothing 
next to the divine, the question before us in this context is the relative worth of different people in the 
same society. Elsewhere I have argued that humility requires an accurate assessment of one’s merits 
rather than, as others have maintained, ignorance of or false beliefs about one’s worth. See G. Alex 
Sinha, Modernizing the Virtue of Humility, 90 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 259 (2012). 
181. See Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Servility and Self-Respect, 57 MONIST 87, 87–88 (1973)) (arguing, 
from a Kantian point of view, that “there are nonutilitarian moral reasons for each person, regardless of 
his merits, to respect himself” (and thus not to display servility)).  
182. See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, DIGNITY, RANK AND RIGHTS (Meir Dan-Cohen ed., Oxford 
Univ. Press reprt. ed. 2015) (2012) (arguing that human dignity conveys the notion of high stature or 
rank shared by all human beings and serves to ground and explain the scope of our rights).  
183. Notably, certain groups still face (or until recently still faced) explicitly unequal treatment. 
See Li Cohen, Trump Administration Erases Health Care Protections for Transgender Patients During 
Pride Month, CBS NEWS (June 13, 2020, 8:06 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-











some of the law’s demands are therefore pointedly unfair in a manner that 
may justifiably and accurately lead members of systemically disadvantaged 
groups to perceive an affront to their self-worth. Moreover, systemic 
disadvantage itself implicates the self-respect of individuals who experience 
it, even aside from any specific unfair demands of the law. Those two 
conclusions form the basis for nontrivial resistance to the law, even in a 
system that may be relatively just overall.  
C. Virtuous Law-Breaking 
As a result of its depth and breadth, systemic disadvantage confounds 
attempts to reduce it to a comprehensive list of constitutive wholesale 
operations and retail commands. Prima facie skepticism of the law as a 
whole may therefore be justified for systemically disadvantaged groups.184 
But legal commands vary in their implications for the self-respect of 
members of such groups, and only some reflect direct discrimination or bear 
a significant propensity for generating inequitable results. There is a 
difference, for example, between wholesale prohibitions on mala in se 
offenses and discriminatory enforcement of those prohibitions (such as 
through harsher policing and sentencing).185 The following subsections 
argue that allocating proper weight to the self-respect of systemically 
disadvantaged individuals provides a defeasible basis for their 
noncompliance with the law in at least two different scenarios. The first 
arises in situations where the law—whether through wholesale or retail 
operations—makes certain types of unfair demands on them. The second 
arises in situations where law-breaking may function to draw attention to 




June of 2020 that “the Trump administration . . . is rolling back Obama-era health care protections for 
people who are transgender”); Adam Liptak, Civil Rights Law Protects Gay and Transgender Workers, 
Supreme Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2020, updated June 16, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/15/us/gay-transgender-workers-supreme-court.html 
[https://perma.cc/RV35-MEVR] (reporting that, before June of 2020, when the Supreme Court ruled 
that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 bars discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender 
identity, “it was legal in more than half of the states to fire workers for being gay, bisexual or 
transgender”). 
184. This result carries potentially significant theoretical implications that I cannot fully explore 
in this Article. 
185. See Avi Samuel Garbow, The Federal Environmental Crimes Program: The Lorax and 
Economics 101, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 47, 51–52 (2001) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary to explain the 
difference between a malum in se offense—one that is wrong in itself, not because it is prohibited by 
law—and a malum prohibitum offense—one that is not wrong in itself but is only wrong because and to 











1. Resisting Unfair Demands of the Law 
Operations of the law that directly reinforce the harms experienced by 
members of systemically disadvantaged groups, or capitalize on their 
disadvantaged state, carry the gravest implications for the self-respect of 
their members. Three types of legal operations rise to that level: 1) 
wholesale provisions that, whether intentionally or otherwise, consistently 
operate to the relative detriment of members of a systemically 
disadvantaged group;186 2) retail operations that are (or reasonably appear 
to be) levied against people based on the morally or legally irrelevant 
criteria that constitute group membership;187 or 3) retail operations that 
result in harsher outcomes based on morally or legally irrelevant criteria that 
constitute group membership.188 These three categories capture legal 
operations that are distinctively unfair because they are inequitable in effect 
or application to people who already experience systemic disadvantage. 
They may even rely for their effect in part on the bare fact of the systemic 
disadvantage of particular individuals or groups affected by them. For 
simplicity, I will refer to these sorts of legal operations as “unfair demands,” 
although they are hardly the only demands of the law that are unfair in some 
meaningful sense. Beyond inviting prima facie skepticism, these unfair 
demands warrant a stronger and less deferential response than most theorists 
have historically allowed.  
The first level at which we should evaluate the proper response to unfair 
demands is one of attitude, which is distinct from the level at which one 
decides whether to comply.189 How should members of disadvantaged 
groups feel when faced with such demands? Again, a range of responses 




186. A notorious example of this type of provision is the vast federal sentencing disparity 
formerly in effect between drug offenses involving crack cocaine and those involving powder cocaine. 
See Deborah J. Vagins & Jesselyn McCurdy, Cracks in the System: Twenty Years of the Unjust Federal 
Crack Cocaine Law, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Oct. 2006), https://www.aclu.org/other/cracks-
system–20-years-unjust-federal-crack-cocaine-law [https://perma.cc/M8TC-RNTP]. Another example 
might be use-of-force guidelines for police that disproportionately result in harm to members of a 
particular systemically disadvantaged group. 
187. An example might be an individual police officer’s demand, when driven by bias, that a 
driver of color pull over. As noted above, the history of discrimination against certain systemically 
disadvantaged groups helps to lower the bar to an inference by the target of such a retail demand that 
the demand reflects some sort of illicit bias. 
 188. An example might be criminal sentencing decisions that, whether deliberately or not, are 
harsher toward a defendant in part because of his race. See King & Light, supra note 167. 











fealty or deference.190 Fundamentally, however, one reasonable response to 
any unfair demand—even a relatively minor, interpersonal, non-legal one—
is resentment or indignation. Thus, when faced with an unfair legal demand 
from a system that has historically treated one’s group worse than others, 
self-respect justifies one in taking offense. As the data cited above suggest, 
such unfair demands are common. 
Recognizing that resentment is an appropriate attitude toward parts of 
the law for a nontrivial set of the law’s subjects exposes the virtue of 
lawfulness to serious pressure. Resentment does not conduce to obedience 
or deference so much (at best) as to grudging compliance.191 Justified 
resentment provides a reasonable basis for a subject of a legal order to 
undertake serious moral deliberation about how to proceed, opening the 
door to a broader range of scenarios in which noncompliance may be likely 
and even morally appropriate.192 Aquinas, for example, worried that 
excessively onerous legal demands may lead to resentment or rebellion.193 
Beyond undermining the aims of the law, justified resentment creates an 
especially sharp tension for strong virtue jurisprudence because it suggests 
the law is positively counterproductive in some important respects.194 But, 
strictly speaking, resentment of the law does not entail noncompliance; one 
might resent an unfair demand but still determine it is best to comply.  
On a second level, then, the question is whether and when self-respect 
justifies or requires noncompliance with unfair demands of the law. I claim 
that self-respect will at times provide a basis for virtuous defiance of unfair 
demands, though it will much more rarely require defiance of unfair 
demands. In fact, one reason why it may be virtuous but not obligatory for 
a member of a systemically disadvantaged group to break the law is 
specifically because, for morally inappropriate reasons, the stakes of 
breaking the law are often higher for members of such groups. Although 




190. The power of the law to cultivate obedience is precisely what makes it valuable from the 
perspective of strong virtue jurisprudence. If the law can cultivate virtue, there is little reason to doubt 
that it can also cultivate vice, such as excessive deference or servility. See Adam D. Reich & Seth J. 
Prins, The Disciplining Effect of Mass Incarceration on Labor Organization, 125 AM. J. SOC. 1303 
(2020) (arguing that “[m]ass incarceration may discipline low-wage workers by decreasing their 
likelihood of participating in organizations through which they might gain economic power individually 
and collectively”). 
191. It is difficult to say the law promotes human flourishing by conditioning people toward 
virtue if a significant number of the law’s subjects are righteously resentful of the law’s demands.   
192. The balance of the present subsection addresses this issue. 
193. George, Central Tradition, supra note 71, at 35. 
194. Strong virtue jurisprudence accepts that the aims of the law are to promote virtuous 











with respect to defiance of unfair demands, it is possible to identify some 
important parameters. 
A traditional virtue-driven account of moral deliberation emphasizes 
the role of practical wisdom (“phronesis”), which is essentially the capacity 
to reason about the nature of one’s options along the different axes 
established by the various virtues: how, under the present circumstances, 
would a good person act? In other words, how would competing courses of 
conduct balance the (at times divergent) demands of generosity, courage, 
temperance, and so forth? The implications of any course of conduct for the 
different virtues, even in quotidian scenarios, can be extremely complex, 
and reasoning well about such matters is itself a marker of virtue.195  
Historically, that sort of nuanced moral deliberation has not been 
expected of individuals facing the demands of the law; the mere fact that 
the law requires a course of action has generally been regarded as providing 
a powerful reason simply to do it. As Edmundson puts it when explaining 
the typical view of the prima facie obligations to obey the law, the reason 
for action provided by a legal demand is “one that is ordinarily decisive and 
. . . one toward which deference is worth cultivating.”196 Although 
Edmundson does not describe virtue jurisprudence per se in that line of text, 
the typical view of the virtue of lawfulness—the baseline set by the 
presumption that virtue attaches to some sort of disposition to follow the 
law—renders his language apt across the board. 
Of course, the fact that the law demands something of us does provide 
powerful reasons to do it, although many of those reasons are largely 
prudential.197 Leaving aside the moral content of a particular legal 
injunction, it can be risky to break the law; depending on the form of law-
breaking, one might face the use of force by police, in addition to significant 
financial, temporal, and reputational costs associated with different forms 




195. Hursthouse makes this point by reference to the virtue of generosity, although she also 
notes that it applies to the other virtues as well: 
Each of the virtues involves getting things right, for each involves phronesis, or practical 
wisdom, which is the ability to reason correctly about practical matters. [For example,] in the 
case of generosity this involves giving the right amount of the right sort of thing, for the right 
reasons, to the right people, on the right occasions. 
HURSTHOUSE, VIRTUE ETHICS, supra note 15, at 12–13. 
196. See text accompanying supra note 142.   
197. Depending on how we understand prudence, we might see it as a manifestation of practical 
wisdom, see supra note 195, or as a stand-alone virtue, see, e.g., Feldman, supra note 31, at 1431 
(incorporating the “virtue[] of prudence” into an analysis of tort law). As I argue below, however, harsh 
penalties for noncompliance with the law can weigh in favor of compliance for problematic reasons that 











disadvantaged groups—by assumption, for reasons that are not defensible—
distorting the calculations about compliance faced by qualifying 
individuals. Even without any such distortion, however, it is partly as a 
result of the possible costs of noncompliance that a disposition toward 
lawfulness carries certain advantages for its possessor, one of the key 
criteria for constituting a virtue.198 Additionally, the law bans certain 
conduct that we generally and appropriately regard as immoral.199 And for 
prohibitions that regulate conduct that would otherwise be morally neutral, 
the mere fact that the law prohibits such conduct may create expectations of 
compliance from other members of the community, leading to conflict for 
even morally minor violations. In short, the virtue of lawfulness is popular 
in part because it has some plausibility to it. 
Nevertheless, even if some disposition toward lawfulness is a virtue, it 
is hardly the only one. Self-respect is also a virtue (or an essential 
component of other virtues), and members of systemically disadvantaged 
groups often face a pronounced tension between the two. When presented 
with that tension by an unfair demand from the law, they may consider 
whether to break the law. Suppose a member of a systemically 
disadvantaged group confronts a choice about whether to comply with a 
specific legal demand, such as whether to stop walking on a public street so 
that a police officer can search him. The simplest response might be for him 
to comply. But, depending on the circumstances, his sense of self-respect 
may give him a powerful moral reason, anchored in the virtues, not to do 
so.200   
If the circumstances give rise to a reasonable inference that he is being 
targeted for his race, for example, he may undertake an inquiry into whether 
compliance is warranted.201 In calibrating his response to the demand, he 
will consider the prudence of complying, assessing whether it is positively 




198. See supra text accompanying note 66 (noting that Hursthouse interprets “[t]he standard 
neo-Aristotelian premise” about the relationship between virtue and eudaimonia to encompass the view 
that “the virtues benefit their possessor”).  
199. See supra note 185 (distinguishing between malum in se and malum prohibitum offenses). 
200. In some cases, it is not merely prohibitive to defy the law, but positively impossible. If one 
is given an unduly harsh sentence because of some purportedly-neutral-but-in-fact-discriminatory 
guideline, it is not clear what defiance even looks like, except perhaps attempting to escape incarceration. 
Revising these sorts of provisions requires other forms of pressure, such as protest or civil disobedience. 
See infra Section III.C.2. 
201. Some might characterize the effect of experiencing justified resentment as providing a 
“liberty” of sorts: a liberty to contemplate morally justified law-breaking. I think the better 
characterization of the situation is as a penalty: a reasonable level of self-respect, combined with his 
situation, compels him to confront a difficult dilemma with potentially costly consequences regardless 











penalties of resistance, even if physical danger is not a factor; and whether, 
all things considered, it is “worth it” to resist.202 Other virtues may be 
relevant too. Suppose he has a child in tow; as a father, he must weigh not 
just his obligations to shield her from physical harm and the deprivation of 
his presence, but also the lessons his choice will hold for her both about 
lawfulness and about self-respect. It might, in fact, be courageous to resist, 
or it might be rash. It might be wise, or it might be foolish.  
For the systemic reasons identified above, the prudential scales may be 
tilted against noncompliance, but that is hardly a foregone conclusion.203  
The balance will also depend in part on whether (and to what extent) we 
regard lawfulness as a free-standing virtue. Notably, the clear, principled 
basis for resistance offered here—limited to specific types of legal mandates 
as applied to disadvantaged groups—entails only relatively minor damage 
to a general preference for lawfulness. Perhaps more importantly, even 
when it is prudent to comply with an unfair demand from the law, that 
verdict is not driven by unanimous alignment of the virtues. Self-respect 
provides a defeasible reason to resist unfair demands of the law; when that 
reason is properly defeated by other considerations, the individual who 
elects to comply does the right thing, all things considered. But she must 
trade off some measure of self-respect to get there. Here is where it is 
especially relevant that the costs of noncompliance may be particularly high 
for members of certain systemically disadvantaged groups. Not only is the 
fact that such costs are higher an affront to the self-respect of members of 
those groups, but the higher costs of resistance perversely weigh against the 
prudence of a key form of self-respecting response. Such unfair demands 
are truly vicious, exacting an obscene cost that the legal system ought not 
to impose on anyone, especially if its purpose (per strong virtue 
jurisprudence) is to condition virtuous behavior.204  
2. Protesting Systemic Disadvantage 
Unfair demands of the law, as defined above, are particularly sharp 




202. This example consists of a questionable retail demand, but we could run a similar thought 
experiment with a wholesale legal demand that is purportedly neutral but typically discriminatory in 
application. 
203. See supra Section III.A. That is not necessarily true of all systemically disadvantaged 
groups, however. 
204. In other words, vicious demands to compliance conflict directly with the purpose of a legal 
system designed to promote the virtues. Even leaving the virtues aside, however, one might be able to 











members of certain groups. If self-respect justifies resistance to unfair 
demands of the law, it also justifies the possibility of defying provisions of 
the law (whether unfair or not) to force a societal reckoning with systemic 
disadvantage. Once again, the variables that shape a moral judgment about 
when and how to do that will vary based on the group, but the greater and 
more longstanding the disadvantage, and the more infeasible it is to generate 
change through other means (such as voting), the more justifiable it is to 
contemplate violating the law for the purpose of promoting equality for 
members of one’s group. In short, self-respect offers a valid basis in virtue 
for seeking to eliminate one’s own systemic disadvantage, and a defeasible 
consideration in favor of violating even reasonably fair demands of the law 
to accomplish that goal. This form of legal defiance amounts roughly to civil 
disobedience, although that term typically carries certain implications and 
qualifications that I reject.205   
Once again, much of the literature on civil disobedience arises in the 
context of broader theoretical debates about state legitimacy and the prima 
facie duty to obey the law.206 Certain prominent definitions of “civil 
disobedience” incorporate moral limitations that sharply cabin the extent to 
which resistance might be justified. In Section II, we noted one influential 
characterization of civil disobedience as “public, conscientious, nonviolent 
refusal to comply with the law.”207 Edmundson endorses a similar “petition” 
view of civil disobedience that he attributes to John Rawls and others, on 
which one might act rightly in disobeying the law “if, but only if, her actions 
are public, nonviolent, and are intended as an appeal to officials and fellow 
citizens to reconsider and rectify what is in fact a serious injustice.”208 
According to Edmundson, more disruptive or surreptitious forms of law-
breaking—“sabotage, terrorism, and furtive noncompliance”—are 
incompatible with this view, at least in “reasonably just legal systems.”209  
These limitations on the “proper” forms of law-breaking in the civil 
disobedience context may seem relatively reasonable in the abstract, but ex 
ante blanket prohibitions on methods of protest are difficult to justify on a 
virtue-based analysis even if more extreme methods are rarely justified by 




205. One could resist an unfair demand specifically to draw attention to its unfairness, but, as 
the preceding subsection argues, that is not the only valid reason for resisting an unfair demand.   
206. See Edmundson, Law Abidance, supra note 12, at 7 (noting some of the key literature on 
civil disobedience). 
207. See supra text accompanying note 117. 
208. See Edmundson, Law Abidance, supra note 12, at 7. Edmundson believes that the virtue 
of law-abidance is compatible with a “petition” view of civil disobedience. Id. at 9. 











injustice is an especially complicated moral judgment, taxing practical 
wisdom because weighty factors pull in different directions. Initial moral 
judgments about participating in protests are at best approximate both 
because effective protest often requires collective action, and because 
protests may trigger provocative or even violent responses. As a result, it is 
difficult to create and adhere to a careful plan when participating in protests 
of any significant size.  
But where systemic disadvantage has persisted for decades or longer, 
and less disruptive mechanisms for raising awareness of the issue of 
inequality have proved ineffective, considerations of self-respect could well 
count in favor of defying the law in an increasingly raucous manner. That 
is especially plausible where the response of law enforcement to peaceful 





210. Recent Black Lives Matter protests encountered aggressive police responses around the 
country, with officers deploying tear gas, batons, pepper balls and more, even when the protests 
themselves were peaceful. See Adam Gabbatt, Protests About Police Brutality Are Met With Wave of 
Police Brutality Across US, GUARDIAN (June 6, 2020, 4:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2020/jun/06/police-violence-protests-us-george-floyd [https://perma.cc/7PSA–3GM5] (reporting 
that “police brutality,” including “[u]se of teargas, batons, pepper spray, fists, feet and vehicles against 
protestors” has prompted “lawsuits and international condemnation,” and noting that these “actions have 
left thousands of protesters in jail and injured many others, leaving some with life-threatening injuries”); 
Meg Kelly, Joyce Sohyun Lee & Jon Swain, George Floyd Death Protests: Police Partially Blinded 
Eight People on the Same Day of Protests, WASH. POST (July 14, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2020/07/14/george-floyd-protests-police-
blinding/?arc404=true [https://perma.cc/WP2D-RWNL] (reporting on a dozen protestors, journalists or 
passersby who were partially blinded after police fired projectiles that hit them in the eye). Among the 
most notorious incidents was the forceful dispersion of peaceful protestors near the White House for a 
presidential photo op at a church nearby. See Rick Noack, How the Clearing of Lafayette Square Made 
the White House Look a Bit More Like the Kremlin, WASH. POST (June 11, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/06/11/how-clearing-lafayette-square-made-white-house-
look-bit-more-like-kremlin/ [https://perma.cc/62ZW-UCAK] One attorney began maintaining a public 
spreadsheet of links to videos of police apparently deploying excessive force in response to these 
protests, accumulating approximately 1,500 discrete entries in the first two months of the protests. See 
Greg Doucette, George Floyd Protest – Police Brutality Videos on Twitter, GOOGLE DOCS, 
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1YmZeSxpz52qT–
10tkCjWOwOGkQqle7Wd1P7ZM1wMW0E/edit#gid=0 [https://perma.cc/3UCJ-LXCK ] (last visited 
July 30, 2020). Months after the protests subsided, the New York Times gained access to “reports by 
outside investigators, watchdogs and consultants analyzing the police response to [Black Lives Matter] 
protests in nine major cities, including four of the nation’s largest.” Kim Barker, Mike Baker & Ali 
Watkins, In City After City, Police Mishandled Black Lives Matter Protests, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/20/us/protests-policing-george-
floyd.html#click=https://t.co/evwGRrj5YK [https://perma.cc/NZR6-U47S] These “reports repeatedly 
blamed police departments for escalating violence instead of taming it . . . [, concluding that they] often 












Although self-respect establishes a moral basis for making oneself 
heard in search of equality, considerations of self-respect might properly 
give way to other factors once again. Contemplating any form of protest 
will involve weighing the anticipated effect of that  protest on the goal of 
advancing one’s message,211 the costs of being subjected to violence by the 
police212 or by hostile private citizens,213 and the implications of one’s 
methods for the interests of other people.214 As with resistance to unfair 
demands, prudence thus factors in the likely response of law enforcement, 
which protestors have every reason to expect will differ to some extent 




211. See Kim Parker, Juliana Menasce Horowitz & Monica Anderson, Amid Protests, 
Majorities Across Racial and Ethnic Groups Express Support for the Black Lives Matter Movement, 
PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2020), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2020/06/12/amid-protests-majorities-
across-racial-and-ethnic-groups-express-support-for-the-black-lives-matter-movement/ 
[https://perma.cc/BRA6–9ZMA] (summarizing polling from several weeks into the 2020 Black Lives 
Matter protests showing that approximately “[t]wo-thirds of U.S. adults say they support the 
movement”). 
212. See supra note 210 (collecting sources discussing police use of force against Black Lives 
Matter protestors all around the country). 
213. See, e.g., Neena Satija, Emily Davies & Dalton Bennett, Amid Massive Demonstrations, 
Vehicles Striking Protesters Raise Disturbing Echoes of 2017 Charlottesville Attack, WASH. POST (June 
15, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2020/06/15/cars-ramming-protests/ 
[https://perma.cc/2T9N–4YCQ] (cataloging at least 19 instances in which private citizens deliberately 
drove cars into protestors). 
214. See KIRO 7 News Staff, Businesses Damaged, Looted During Protest on Capitol Hill, 
KIRO 7 (July 23, 2020, 12:54 PM), https://www.kiro7.com/news/local/businesses-damaged-looted-
during-protests-capitol-hill/4HWMBWRRUFC65OFKPP3G36GZDU/ [https://perma.cc/586M-Y4SN] 
(reporting on damage to private businesses that occurred during a protest in Seattle, Washington). Some 
prominent cases of property damage appear to have been caused by provocateurs rather than protestors, 
however. See Doha Madani, ‘Umbrella Man’ Aimed to ‘Incite Violence’ During George Floyd Protests, 
Police Say, NBC NEWS (July 28, 2020 11:11 PM, updated Jul. 28, 2020 11:19 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/umbrella-man-aimed-incite-violence-during-george-floyd-
protests-police-n1235148 [https://perma.cc/T9AN-J3UQ]. 
215. The frequency of documented police violence against Black Lives Matter protestors aligns 
with surveys of police attitudes toward racial justice issues generally. Surveys have shown, at minimum, 
that majorities of police regard protests of police violence toward Black people as reflecting “anti-police 
bias,” and only a very small minority of white officers—much smaller than the share of whites as a 
whole—see a need for the country to take additional steps to ensure equal rights for Black people. See 
Drew Desilver, Michael Lipka & Dalia Fahmy, 10 Things We Know About Race and Policing in the 
U.S., PEW RES. CTR. (June 3, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/06/03/10-things-we-
know-about-race-and-policing-in-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/G2W6-QM9X]. There have also been 
reports of police treating white or white supremacist protestors more favorably, both during the 2020 
Black Lives Matter protests and before. See, e.g., Mara Hvistendahl & Alleen Brown, Armed Vigilantes 
Antagonizing Protesters Have Received a Warm Reception from Police, INTERCEPT (June 19, 2020, 1:55 
PM), https://theintercept.com/2020/06/19/militia-vigilantes-police-brutality-protests/ 
[https://perma.cc/7JYH-Y4GS] (noting a “long history of vigilantes working with police and 
government officials to oppress Black and Indigenous people,” and reporting on several recent instances 
where police purportedly treated counter-protestors more favorably, including referring to them as 
“armed friendlies”); Sam Levin, California Police Worked With Neo-Nazis to Pursue ‘Anti-Racist’ 











kindness will likely count against sacrificing the property and physical 
safety of bystanders or other members of the community, even as they count 
in favor of taking effective measures to improve the situations of future 
members of one’s own disadvantaged group. 
Thus, each mode of protest bears on the virtues in its own way. More 
dangerous or damaging forms of law-breaking must clear a higher moral bar 
before they are justified and will therefore be warranted less frequently 
because they implicate weightier factors that operate to offset the demands 
of self-respect. For example, it will be easier to justify violating a wholesale 
curfew meant to clear the streets of a city after several nights of protests216 
than to justify private property damage. The former does not necessarily 
implicate the interests of members of the community in the same way as the 
latter. But it is difficult to see how one could justify a blanket rule 
prohibiting all forms of property damage,217 and there may be a relevant 
difference between damaging private property (say, a neighborhood store) 
and public property (say, a police car). After all, it is far from clear that a 
virtuous orientation toward one’s community entails symmetrical attitudes 
toward one’s neighbors and toward an arm of the legal system that helps to 
reinforce systemic disadvantage—especially where the conduct of the latter 
is the subject of the protests in the first place.218 In any event, the lack of 
bright-line rules reflects the complex reality of moral decision-making, and 






[https://perma.cc/F854–4J9D] (reporting that “police investigating a violent white nationalist event 
worked with white supremacists in an effort to identify counter-protesters and sought the prosecution of 
activists with ‘anti-racist’ beliefs,” and observing that the officers express[ed] sympathy with white 
supremacists and tr[ied] to protect a neo-Nazi organizer’s identity”). Asymmetrical policing of protests, 
which disproportionately raises the costs of protesting certain systemic disadvantages, provides another 
example of the legal system operating with vicious effect. 
216. See, e.g., Spectrum News Staff, 30 Arrested Following Rochester Protest Condemning 
Curfew, Mayor, RPD, SPECTRUM NEWS: ROCHESTER (July 30, 2020), 
https://spectrumlocalnews.com/nys/rochester/public-safety/2020/07/16/protests-in-rochester--
condemning-curfew--mayor-warren--rpd [https://perma.cc/M6CR-NV88] (reporting on arrests made 
after protestors—who appear to have been protesting peacefully but were in violation of a city curfew—
refused to disperse). 
217. See R.H. Lossin, In Defense of Destroying Property, NATION (June 10, 2020), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/activism/blm-looting-protest-vandalism/ [https://perma.cc/6FHW-
VUXW] (asking, “what if property destruction is more than an understandable lapse of judgment and 
loss of control? What if it is not a frustrated, emotional reaction but a reasonable and articulate expression 
in itself?”).  
218. As noted above, this is a key target of ongoing Black Lives Matter protests. See Buchanan 











D. The Limitations of Lawfulness 
The foregoing demonstrates that virtuous law-breaking eludes simple 
formulas. More specific guidelines require not only more definite 
interpretations of the virtues themselves but also more detailed descriptions 
of the scenarios in which law-breaking may be justified. But it is also 
apparent that grounding the possibility of virtuous resistance to the law in 
self-respect—even when focusing specifically on systemically 
disadvantaged groups, as I have done—provides a basis for resisting the law 
that conflicts on a fundamental level with typical interpretations of the 
virtue of lawfulness. I do not mean that a superior interpretation of the virtue 
of lawfulness will never conflict with considerations of self-respect, for that 
is surely false. Tension among the virtues is common. Rather, I mean that 
the tension between the traditional virtue of lawfulness and the virtue of 
self-respect is too deep to be reconciled well; the exact same attitude that 
one labels virtuous the other labels vicious. Moreover, although the various 
forms of the virtue of lawfulness discussed above build in exceptions, 
especially for particularly unjust commands emanating from particularly 
unjust systems, the resistance justified by self-respect does not align well 
with those exceptions.  
Both Aristotle and Aquinas placed a premium on broad respect for the 
law because of its essential conditioning effect, and Aquinas at minimum 
frowned on self-serving resistance to the law.219 It is unclear if either would 
accept any meaningful measure of civil disobedience.220 Moreover, it is 
difficult to imagine that many theorists writing on the virtue of lawfulness 
would regard the current U.S. legal system as wholly corrupt or unjust; 
under such conditions, many would encourage compliance even with flawed 
legal commands out of an interest in sustaining the system as a whole. By 
contrast, I have argued that there is a basis in virtue (albeit one often offset 
by other considerations) for a significant subset of the population to resent 
and possibly defy certain unfair demands placed upon them by the law, and 
to contemplate breaking reasonable legal provisions in service of 




219. See supra Section II.A–B. 
220. See supra Section II.A–B. 
221. Recall that Solum defends an Aristotelian-inspired view of the virtue of justice as 
lawfulness, which defines a disposition to comply with those laws and social norms that are not 
inconsistent with human flourishing, in situations where such laws or norms provide “salient reasons for 
action.” See supra text accompanying note 99. By limiting his selection of “nomoi” to those that are not 
inconsistent with human flourish, Solum may open the door to the possibility that his favored disposition 











conclusion stands even if we ultimately determine that our present system 
is relatively just, although no such judgment is required either way. 
Edmundson’s view of law-abidance as a virtue is also insufficient to 
capture the resistance contemplated above. Recall that he separates 
wholesale and retail operations of the law; although he does not require 
overwhelming enthusiasm for wholesale operations “in bulk,” he claims that 
the law-abiding labor under “much more stringent constraint[s] . . . with 
respect to retail operations.”222 Outside the context of completely corrupted 
systems,223 Edmundson accepts civil disobedience only in the narrow 




described at a level of generality that makes it impossible to be sure, but I am skeptical he would go so 
far. After all, my account claims it could be morally good for individuals to resist pointedly unfair 
demands of the law, even when those demands are not particularly onerous. Moreover, his view does 
not seem to make space for resistance of fair demands of the law when demanded by considerations of 
self-respect. One other point bears emphasis here: although Solum’s view defines a particular conception 
of the virtue of justice, both Solum and Hursthouse have cautioned against over-emphasizing the virtue 
of justice at the expense of other important virtues. See HURSTHOUSE, VIRTUE ETHICS, supra note 15, at 
6 (arguing that “it has become all too common to allow a vague concept of justice and rights to 
encompass large areas of morality that virtue ethicists believe are better dealt with in terms of other, 
more concrete, virtues.”); Solum, Virtue of Lawfulness, supra note 95, at 172 (“Justice is not the only 
human virtue. Indeed, one of the chief insights of virtue ethics in general and virtue jurisprudence in 
particular is the realization that not all of the work of morality needs to be done by the virtue of justice.”) 
I have barely addressed the virtue of justice in this Article, focusing instead on the fundamental notion 
of self-respect. I take this to be an advantage of my approach, which attempts to bring overlooked 
elements of virtue-centered human flourishing back into the picture.  
222. Edmundson, Law Abidance, supra note 12, at 9. Among other things, he expects that 
subjects of the law will grant officers of the legal system a presumption of good faith in officially making 
retail demands. Id. at 8, note 16 (“The law-abiding, and others, will normally be entitled to assume that 
officials with whom they deal act in good faith whenever they act under the color of office.”) Edmundson 
recognizes “patent bad faith” as a “defeating condition,” which “may relieve the law-abiding of their 
(defeasible) duty of compliance.” Id. Specifically, “[w]here official corruption is so endemic that 
connivance is the customary social norm, the law-abiding may be disposed to ‘go along to get along.’” 
Id. But many of the unfair retail demands that warrant resentment and possible defiance are not issued 
in patent bad faith; they reflect systemic biases or personal biases made manifest through officers of the 
legal system who believe they are acting in good faith. More generally, the attitude that Edmundson 
seems to favor toward retail operations is unduly submissive for members of systemically disadvantaged 
groups, even in circumstances where they elect to comply. Although he insists that to be law-abiding is 
not the same as being pusillanimous, he claims that “[t]he fully virtuous law-abiding actor . . . willingly 
submits to the direct orders of legal officials, welcoming the fact that—however burdensome—his 
cooperation manifests and reinforces a wholesome solidarity with them.” Id. at 13. 
223. See Edmundson, Law Abidance, supra note 12, at 8, note 16 (“Where official corruption 
is so endemic that connivance is the customary social norm, the law-abiding may be disposed to ‘go 
along to get along.’”  
224. According to Edmundson: 
But the law-abiding may indeed engage in civil disobedience in the ‘proper’ and ‘narrow’ sense 
defined by the petition view. A law-abiding person may, in my view, enjoy ‘soft’ drugs 
recreationally and may serve modest amounts of alcohol to minors on family occasions. But 
she will not slip away from a mass arrest, even if she might do so safely. A law-abiding person 
may harbor fugitive slaves. But she will either comply with or openly defy an official seeking 











The view I have defended clearly conflicts with Edmundson’s. Self-
respect contemplates resistance to certain unfair retail demands of the law 
as much as unfair wholesale demands. Retail operations are the tip of the 
sword for a discriminatory system that purports to be neutral. They can be 
every bit as unfair as wholesale demands, and, because they single out 
individuals or small groups, they can be especially humiliating and 
degrading.225 Cultivating Edmundson’s level of deference toward retail 
operations cannot be reconciled with the demands of self-respect, at least 
not for members of systemically disadvantaged groups. Moreover, self-
respect counts in favor of a wider range of legal resistance for the purposes 
of protest.226  
One might worry that the argument from self-respect erodes the 
comforting notion that lawfulness offers a steady proxy for virtue. To the 
limited extent that conclusion might tend to destabilize the legal system, 
however, the problem lies not in the individuals who hold a legitimate basis 
to resist the law but rather in the system itself. A sufficiently fair system 
would not extract compliance viciously from its subjects. In short, if the 
foregoing argument about self-respect is compelling, the virtue of 
lawfulness needs to be recalibrated or discarded.  
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ARGUMENT FROM SELF-RESPECT 
Although I have endeavored to illuminate only a single virtuous basis 
for resisting the law—albeit a powerful one—the implications of the 
foregoing argument are substantial. First, the example of systemic 
disadvantage highlights the problem with the Aretaic leap.227 The power of 
the legal system to impose costs on its subjects ensures that its anticipated 
reactions to our conduct go to the heart of our prudential calculations about 
how to act. When the system operates unevenly based on morally irrelevant 
criteria, as it so often does, it puts its thumb on the scales in our calculations 
about how to attain virtue and avoid vice in complying with the law. The 




a statute forbidding malum prohibitum, if disobedience is widespread or customary, but she 
will not covertly defy an administrative prerogative. Her defiance exhibits law-abidance only 
if it takes the form of a petition. 
See Edmundson, Law Abidance, supra note 12, at 9–10. Edmundson favorably quotes Joel Feinberg for 
the notion that civil disobedience is “a violation of the law without loss of respect for the law.” Id. at 9. 
But, according to the view defended here, certain subjects of the law may properly lose respect for the 
law.  
225. Resisting unfair demands need not be a last-resort method of petition, on my view.   
226. Compare supra Section.II.C, with supra Section III.C.2.  











compel servility.228 That result raises a severe problem for strong virtue 
jurisprudence, according to which the function of the law is to facilitate our 
virtue-based flourishing. Even for weak virtue jurisprudence, however, the 
fact that the law makes vicious demands explains why, for so many 
substantive areas of the law, it is fruitless to explore what a virtue-centered 
analysis would say in a vacuum. Instead, theorists must contend with how 
the law is applied to gain a full appreciation for the relationship between 
law and virtue.229 One purpose behind advancing the argument above is thus 
to redirect and refocus the rapidly growing area of virtue jurisprudence 
toward non-ideal theory. 
A second significant feature of the argument from self-respect is that it 
helps to capture the richness of actual moral decision-making before the 
law. Virtue ethics is an appealing methodology in part because balancing 
the competing (and perhaps incommensurate) demands of the various 
virtues is part of what makes moral decision-making in the real world so 
difficult. The argument above identifies the possibility of an uncomfortable 
tension arising between the virtue of self-respect and other virtues—for 
example, when the harsh response expected of the legal system compels 
someone to comply with a humiliating retail demand. Notably, typical 
accounts of the virtue of lawfulness mask this complexity by venerating 
lawfulness itself, thereby obscuring the actual intricacy of these choices.  
Similarly, the argument from self-respect also highlights the advantage 
of a virtue-centered framing over the framing of the generic duty to obey 
the law. The argument from self-respect allows us to make distinctions—
elusive to the generic obligation to obey—based upon the obvious truth that 
people are positioned differently before the law in morally relevant respects. 
Members of advantaged groups do not possess the same basis in self-respect 
for resisting the law. It is possible that, at times, some of them face demands 
from the law that are improper or in some sense unfair. It is therefore worth 
exploring what the virtues would direct them to do in such instances. But 
their historical advantages relative to other groups ground different 
inferences about the intent and effect of the legal demands they face, even 
when those demands seem questionable on their face. Similarly, members 
of advantaged groups possess reasons to protest the systemic disadvantage 
of the groups that face it. But the moral explanation for why their protests 
might constitute an expression of virtue—their solidarity with less-




228. It is certainly conceivable that the law imposes vice in other ways as well. 
229. This underscores the significance of my claim that any plausible view of the virtues must 











reasons of self-respect that undergird protests by members of affected 
groups.230 
Third, the argument from self-respect exemplifies the radically 
underappreciated progressive power of virtue jurisprudence, a methodology 
that is often deployed in defense of conservative objectives. Beyond 
exalting lawfulness generally, as explored in Section II, virtue analysis is a 
popular vehicle for justifying the use of the law to regulate private conduct 
that various theorists regard as immoral.231 Recall that others have also 
argued that virtue jurisprudence, when applied to theories of adjudication, 
would support originalist constitutional interpretation.232 But, 
notwithstanding its popularity in conservative circles, there is nothing 
inherently conservative about virtue jurisprudence itself. Indeed, the 
inequities perpetuated by the legal system cast doubt on these conservative 
applications of virtue theory, perhaps because they neglect to contend with 
the law as it is in fact applied. For example, it is difficult to see how the 
virtues would provide an unalloyed endorsement of a method of 
constitutional interpretation that ennobles or gives effect to the biases of the 
Framers against individuals who, centuries later, have clearly clustered in 
systemically disadvantaged groups.233  
Fourth, and relatedly, considerations of self-respect suggest a strong 
connection between promoting virtue-centered human flourishing and 
promoting equality. Under strong virtue jurisprudence, promoting the 
virtues has at times been understood as an alternative to promoting other 
ends, including individual rights and privileges.234 Farrelly and Solum have 
explicitly suggested that strong virtue jurisprudence views “the fundamental 
concepts of legal philosophy” as being concerned with “virtue and 
excellence” rather than salient alternatives, including equality.235 But a 
system that perpetuates certain inequalities directly undermines the 




230. Yet another advantage that the virtues provide is the possibility of assessing the moral side 
of law-compliance by looking at factors beyond the legitimacy of the state. See Edmundson, Law 
Abidance, supra note 12, at 6 (observing that, relative to typical accounts of the generic duty to obey the 
law, “[a] virtue-ethical account need not place such stress on the moral credentials of the state; and this 
is an advantage”). 
231. See GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY, supra note 
38; Cantu, Virtue Jurisprudence and the American Constitution, supra note 38. 
232. See Solum, The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory, supra note 13; Strang, Originalism 
and the Aristotelian Tradition: Virtue's Home in Originalism, supra note 39.  
233. See G. Alex Sinha, Original(ism) Sin, 95 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2021–22) 
(considering virtue-based arguments for and against originalist constitutional interpretation). 
234. See FARRELLY & SOLUM, Aretaic Theories, supra note 13, at 2 (discussing and defending 
this view). 











stability. This conclusion counts in favor of a more nuanced form of virtue 
jurisprudence that takes seriously the aims of traditional rights-based 
theories on the possibility that the two methodological approaches dovetail 
in significant ways.  
CONCLUSION 
The growing popularity and importance of virtue jurisprudence is 
undeniable, but its scattershot application, its focus on ideal theory, and its 
conservative presumptions about the relationship between individuals and 
the law have all colluded to hide its potential. Virtue jurisprudence is both 
powerful and plastic, and it is backed by a rich philosophical tradition. It is 
a methodology that should be adopted more widely to identify and explore 
the deficiencies in the law. As the foregoing suggests, it holds a particular 
and underappreciated promise for theorists working on systemic 
disadvantage and other forms of harm imposed by the legal system itself.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
